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The reality of exporting a massive U.S. military contract while fighting
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan raised alarms. It was enough to transform
champions of business competition into manufacturing protectionists.'
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States ("U.S.") Air Force aerial refueling tanker contract is one
of the largest in history,2 making it the perfect opportunity to examine the role of
international and domestic companies in U.S. Government defense spending. The
aerial tanker provides mid-flight refueling capabilities for numerous U.S. military
planes, including bombers, fighters, and surveillance aircraft.3 Produced between
1953 and 1963,4 the U.S. Air Force aerial refueling tanker5 fleet remains one of
the oldest working combat weapon systems within the U.S. Department of
1. Tim Carpenter, Tanker War: Thousands of Kansas Jobs Hang in the Balance, TOPEKA CAPITAL-
JOURNAL (June 29, 2008), http://cjonline.com/stories/062908Ibus_297190495.shtml.
2. Jorn Madslien, Defence Giants Clash over U.S. Tanker Contract, BBC NEWS (June 17, 2009, 1:27),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hilbusiness/810435 1.stm.
3. JEREMIAH GERTLER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RE 34398, AIR FORCE KC-X TANKER AiRCRAFr
PROGRAM: BACKGROUND AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 2(2009).
4. Mike Benbow, Boeing Rallies Forces for Tanker Contract, HERALDNET (Sept. 27, 2010),
http://www.heraldnet.com/article/20100927/B1Z/709279893/-1/RSS03.
5. Throughout this article, the aerial refueling tanker will be referred to as "aerial tanker," "tanker," or
"KC-X," as consistent with descriptions of the aircraft by the Department of Defense and defense corporation
officials.
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Defense.6 Based on current estimates, the U.S. Air Force must plan to use the• 7
mission-critical tankers until they are over eighty-years-old.
As the aging tanker nears the end of its life, the U.S. Air Force has attempted
for over a decade8 to award one of the largest defense contracts in history to a
company that can replace the aerial tankers9 before critical military functionality
is compromised.'0 The decade-long attempt to award a successful contract has
met devastating failure for several reasons." When the government held its third
attempt to award the contract in 2010,2 the main competitors in 2010 were
Boeing, a U.S. civilian and defense corporation," and European Aeronautic
Defense and Space Company ("EADS"), a European-based conglomerate 4 that
includes subsidiary Airbus. 5
A. First Attempt Followed by Scandal
The Air Force initially attempted to lease tankers from Boeing.' 6 However,
due to many concerns regarding avoidance of the traditional procurement process
and enormous costs compared to purchasing the tanker,17 the Air Force tried to
lease and buy 100 tankers from Boeing.18 This decision was later overturned in
2004 because of a conspiracy scandal that left officials of both the U.S.
6. Boeing Corp., B-311344 et al., 2008 WL 2514171, at 4 (Comp. Gen. June 18, 2008) [hereinafter
Boeing GAO Protest].
7. GERTLER, supra note 3, at 3 (based on replacing the tanker by fifteen planes annually).
8. Id. at 79 app. C ("The advanced age of the. . . fleet.., has been a matter of concern for policy makers
since the 1990s.").
9. Madslien, supra note 2.
10. 154 CONG. REC. S6,180-02 (daily ed. June 20, 2008) (statement of Sen. Patty Murray) ("Our aerial
refueling tankers-the ones we are talking about with this contract-are the backbone of our global military
strength."); see also GERTLER, supra note 3, at 7 (quoting Department of the Air Force) ("The KC-X remains
the Air Force's highest procurement and recapitalizing priority.").
11. In 2002, the initial lease to Boeing was cancelled after sky-rocketing costs. GERTLER, supra note 3,
at 79 app. C. The subsequent contract award in 2004 was riddled with corruption, which resulted in jail time for
both corporate and government officials. Carpenter, supra note 1. After Northrop Grumman & EADS were
awarded the contract in 2008, Boeing successfully protested the bid. Boeing GAO Protest, supra note 6, at 1-3.
12. John Reed, USAF Sets KC-X First Flight, IOC Dates, DEF. NEWS (Feb. 25, 2010, 16:35),
http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=4514663&c=AME&s=ALL. The formal request for proposal was
released February 24, 2010.
13. About Us, BOEING, http://www.boeing.com/companyoffices/aboutusbrief.html (last visited Jan. 25,
2011).
14. Our Governance: Management and Control, EADS, http://www.eads.com/eads/intlen/our-company/
our-govemance.html (last visited Jan. 25, 2011).
15. Our Company, EADS, http://www.eads.com/eads/int/en/our-company.html (last visited Jan. 25,
2011).
16. GERTLER, supra note 3, at 79 app. C.
17. Id.
18. Nayantara Hensel, Globalization and the U.S. Defense Industrial Base: The Competition for a New
Aerial Refueling Tanker, Bus. ECON., Oct. 2008, at 50-51.
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Department of Defense and Boeing in prison.' 9 Following the scandal, interest in
the global defense marketplace rose, leading Congress to lift a restriction that
would open competition for the contract to major international defense
companies, including EADS.2°
B. Second Attempt and Resulting Protest
The Air Force reopened the tanker contest in 2007 (hereinafter "the Second
Attempt"). 2' Boeing remained in the contest as one of the main competitors. 22 The
other consisted of a partnership between Northrop Grumman, a major U.S.
defense company,23 and Airbus, a European subsidiary of EADS. 24 The domestic-
foreign partnership won the contract in February 2008.25 Boeing quickly
protested the result claiming that the Air Force did not "assess the relative merits
of the proposals in accordance with the evaluation criteria identified in the
[contract bid] solicitation. 6 The U.S. Government Accountability Office27
21sustained the protest, sending the Air Force back to the drawing room to draft
yet another plan of attack.
C. Third, and Hopefully Final, Attempt
Before the Air Force released another competition bid in early 2010
(hereinafter "the Third Attempt"), 29 the same contestants planned to compete
19. Air Force official Darleen Druyun was convicted in 2004 of conspiracy "for jumping in bed with
Boeing while still supervising the company's work for the Air Force." Boeing CEO Mike Sears was also
convicted for offering Druyun a Boeing vice president position as a reward for her attempt to "fix" the
procurement process in Boeing's favor. Carpenter, supra note 1; see also Emma Vandore, EADS Chief: Airbus
Leads Boeing in Air Tanker Competition, KOMO NEWS (July 3, 2010, 9:33 AM), http://www.komonews.
com/news/97733754.html.
20. Carpenter, supra note 1.
21. Boeing GAO Protest, supra note 6, at 5.
22. Leslie Wayne, Northrop and EADS Win Refueling Tanker Deal, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 29, 2008),
http://www.nytimes.com12008/02/29/business/29cnd-tanker.html.
23. NORTHROP GRUMMAN CORP., 2009 NORTHROP GRUMMAN ANNUAL REPORT ii [hereinafter
NORTHROP 2009 ANNUAL REPORT], available at http://www.northropgrumman.compdf/2009_noc-ar.pdf
(Form 10-K, jurisdiction of incorporation for Northrop Grumman Corp. is Delaware, USA).
24. Wayne, supra note 22; Our Company, supra note 15.
25. Wayne, supra note 22.
26. Boeing GAO Protest, supra note 6, at 1.
27. The U.S. Government Accountability Office ("GAO") is "an independent, nonpartisan agency that
works for Congress. Often called the 'congressional watchdog,' GAO investigates how the federal government
spends taxpayer dollars." The GAO is responsible for "issuing legal decisions and opinions, such as bid protest
rulings and reports on agency rules." About GAO, U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF.,
http://www.gao.gov/about/index.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2011).
28. Boeing GAO Protest, supra note 6, at 1-4.
29. Reed, supra note 12. The formal request for proposal was released February 24, 2010.
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once again.'° But upon seeing additional changes in the technical requirements
and capabilities of the tanker, the Northrop Grumman-EADS partnership pulled
out of the race believing the revised proposal clearly favored Boeing.3 Despite
barriers to winning the contract, 32 EADS reentered the contest solo after the
Department of Defense indicated its interest in EADS' participation.3
Unlike prior efforts, the Third Attempt pitted a foreign company against a
domestic company, and members of Congress raised concerns related to job
creation, job protection, 4  and national security.35  Although EADS had
participated in the Second Attempt, it did so as a subcontractor to Northrop
36Grumman, a domestic company. Thus, the concerns raised by a foreign
company winning the contract were alleviated by it partnership with a domestic
37company.
Because Boeing won the contract in early 201 1,38 many of the national
security and job loss concerns that arose during the decade-long contest are moot.
However, officials implied that the decision was based primarily on price.39 No
socio-economic factors or requirements were addressed in deciding whether the
domestic Boeing should have won the contract over its foreign rival 0 Hopefully,
the lack of consideration these factors received in the most recent contest
encourage Congress to change existing defense procurement law and policy to
ensure future contracts are awarded fairly and efficiently using domestic
30. See Christopher Hinton, Pentagon to Present Final Proposal Request to Replace Tankers, MARKET
WATCH (Feb. 24, 2010, 3:37 PM), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/pentagon-to-unveil-final-tanker-request-
2010-02-24?reflink=MW-news-stmp.
31. Press Release, Northrop Grumman Corp., Statement from Northrop Grumman on U.S. Air Force
Aerial Refueling Tanker Program (Mar. 8, 2010), available at http://www.irconnect.com/noc/press/pages/news
_releases.html?d=186116.
32. Pierre Tran, Europe to Challenge U.S. on Tanker Contest, DEF. NEWS (Mar. 11, 2010, 12:29),
http://www.defensenews.comstory.php?i=4535135&c=EUR&s=AIR (quoting EADS Chairman Louis Gallois)
("If we want to stay in, we would have to find another American partner, because there is some extremely
sensitive equipment in that plane which we can't supply.").
33. Mike Mount, Pentagon Extends Tanker Bid Deadline, CNN (Apr. 1, 2010, 2:57 AM), http://www.
cnn.com/2OlOIBUSINESS/04/01/pentagon.tanker/index.html.
34. Benbow, supra note 4 (quoting numerous Congressmen stating concerns of job losses).
35. See Hensel, supra note 18, at 52-53.
36. Wayne, supra note 22.
37. Id. at 52-54.
38. Christopher Drew, Boeing Wins Contract to Build Air Force Tankers, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 24, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/251business/25tanker.html?_r=-l.
39. See id. (noting that two of the three major considerations concerned the bidding price and the long-
term operating and maintenance costs).
40. See Demetri Sevastopulo & Kevin Done, Congress Move may Force Pentagon Tanker Rethink, FIN.
TIMES (July 30, 2008, 8:39), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/37698274-5e08-1 ldd-b354-000077b07658.html#axzz
IAO53urXC.
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preference policies, 4' and to not leave major acquisition decisions to primarily
• 41
price.
The national security and military concerns triggered by the possibility of a
foreign company winning the contract to construct key military equipment
brought up during debates on the Third Attempt arise in other government
procurement contracts.43 One means of addressing these concerns is through
domestic preference policies." Furthermore, a benefit of domestic preferences is
the assurance of supply of critical goods and services during international crises,
lending support to the United States' global military readiness. 4  Additionally,
large purchases of ammunition, clothing, and even food to support armed forces
can, if awarded to domestic companies, create domestic jobs in the defense
industrial base and civilian sectors alike.46 Each of these concerns is crucial to the
United States' global military sovereignty and should be considered during the
contract evaluation process.
This Comment argues that the U.S. Government should institute domestic
preference policies when awarding major defense-related acquisition or
procurement contracts. Part II provides a brief description of current laws and
treaties that govern U.S. defense procurement.47 Additionally, Part II compares
U.S. and international defense procurement policies. Part III analyzes the
significant reasons for preferring U.S. domestic defense companies in major
defense acquisition contract awards;4 8 specifically, to protect national security,
advanced or sensitive technology, and jobs. Finally, Part IV offers several
solutions that Congress and awarding agencies can implement to ensure the
continuance of domestic preference policies.
41. See discussion infra Part IV.
42. See Drew, supra note 38.
43. See, e.g., Now U.S. Congress Buys Only "Made in America" Goods, INT'L Bus. TIMES (Sept. 16,
2010, 5:34 AM), http://www.ibtimes.com/articles/62884/20100916/made-in-america-the-berry-amendment-
extension-marcy-kaptur-larry-kissell-nancy-pelosi.htm (addressing the concerns of both job protection and
national security protection by enforcing domestic preference policies in contracts awarded by the U.S.
Congress and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security).
44. See discussion infra Part HA; see also William R. Hawkins, The Need for Socioeconomic Guidance
in Defense Procurement, PROCUREMENT LAW. 8 (Summer 2005).
45. See discussion infra Part lI.A. 1; see also DEF. SCI. BD., U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., FINAL REPORT OF THE
DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE ON GLOBALIZATION AND SECURITY 18 (1999).
46. See discussion infra Part III.B.2; see also ARIE REICH, INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC PROCUREMENT
LAW: THE EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL REGIMES ON PUBLIC PURCHASING 27 (1999).
47. While all federal agencies are subject to spending and procurement regulations, the U.S. Department
of Defense represents seventy-five percent of all federal procurement and has its own policies and procedures.
See OFFICE OF FED. PROCUREMENT POLICY, FEDERAL PROCUREMENT REPORT 17-18 (2007); see discussion
infra Part II.B. 1-3.
48. This Comment is limited in scope by analyzing and suggesting solutions applied only to major
defense acquisition and procurement contracts that would help sustain the U.S. defense industrial base. Service-
based contracts (as opposed to supply- or procurement-based contracts) and contracts of small pecuniary value
(such as those exempted from the Buy American Act) are not explored.
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II. CURRENT LAWS & TREATIES GOVERNING FEDERAL
DEFENSE PROCUREMENT
Governments at the international, national, and local levels need goods
ranging from office supplies and air conditioning equipment to data management
services and fighter planes.49 In many countries, the government is the largest
consumer of general goods. 0 Some governments procure these items by
acquiring them from the private sector, while others run state-owned factories to
produce government-consumed items."' This section provides an overview of the
laws, regulations, and international treaties that govern defense-related
procurement for the United States, the European Union, and the United
Kingdom.
One of the most direct ways to enforce domestic policies in the realm of
military contracts is by preferring domestic companies in contract awards via
congressional acts.52 Government procurement from the private sector is often
conducted via contracts similar to those used by other businesses. 3 However,
these government contracts are subject to many additional laws and regulations.4
These laws and regulations, which include treaties and international agreements,
further domestic and foreign policy, particularly in the specialized realm of
defense spending.5
A. Why Defense Procurement Contracts Are Different
Defense industries are routinely excluded from numerous international
procurement treaties that promote global trade and competition. 6 The exemption
reflects two fundamental differences between the defense industry and those of
other public and private procurements: sensitive information pertaining to
national security and protectionism.57 Often, government contracts involving the
procurement of office supplies for education programs, air conditioners, or tires
for automobiles, do not directly relate to issues of national security, because they
do not involve sensitive information or threaten a country's people or assets
either domestically or abroad." Arguably, these types of contracts are neither at
49. REICH, supra note 46, at 1.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
53. REICH, supra note 46, at 2.
54. Id. at 2-5.
55. Id. at 2.
56. See infra Part fI.B.3.
57. REICH, supra note 46, at 27-28, 32-34.
58. See, e.g., federal and subcontract opportunity listings by FED. BUS. OPPORTUNITIES,
https://www.fbo.gov/ (last visited Oct. 12, 2010); U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN. SUBCONTRACTING NETWORK,
http://web.sba.gov/subnet/search/index.cfm (last visited Oct. 12, 2010).
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risk of sabotage by foreign countries,59 nor for other countries gaining access to
sensitive information of technical defense systems. 60 Conversely, a wide range of
contracts involving secure computer systems, sensitive technologies used in
armed conflict, and even clothing supplies6' for the armed forces, do present
significant national security concerns.62
"[W]hile civilian contracts are a normal part of any society, military
contracts carry an additional burden: they are vital to national survival." 63 The
resources and industrial base must be available to support military actions, which
would therefore enable a country to defend itself.64 Consequently, these defense-
related contracts trigger a patriotic sense of acquiring goods and services from
domestic sources.65
B. United States Laws, Treaties, and Agreements Governing Procurement
Since the Revolutionary War, the United States has relied on the private
sector to procure defense goods.6 The Department of Defense and other federal
agencies are subjected to a labyrinth of laws, regulations, and policies that
control the procurement of defense-related goods.67
To ensure the effective implementation of these rules and policies, Congress
requires the Department of Defense to conduct annual reviews of contracts
awarded to foreign entities. 6' A recent review of U.S. Department of Defense
59. But see Steve Johnson, Fake Chips Threaten Military, PHYSORG.COM (Sept. 5, 2010), http:I/www.
physorg.com/news203688486.html. Counterfeit goods are becoming more prevalent in government
procurement. As stated in the article, "it's not just the military that's at risk. Chips perform key roles in
countless commercial products, as well as phone links, banking networks, electronic grids and nuclear power
plants."
60. See Spencer S. Hsu, Case Targets Microchips Sold to Navy, WASH. POST (Sept. 15, 2010),
http://www.washingtonpost.conmwp-dyn/content/article/2010/09/14/AR2010091406962.htmi (suggesting that
fake or defective computer chips could contain Trojan horses and other viruses that would allow hackers to
exploit the systems with the installed chips).
61. Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement § 225.7002-1(a)(2) (2010) [hereinafter Defense
FAR Supplement] (restricting the purchase of "clothing and the materials and components thereof' from foreign
sources).
62. Johnson, supra note 59.
63. W. NOEL KEYES, GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS UNDER THE FEDERAL ACQUISITION REGULATION 3 (3d
ed. 2003).
64. See id.
65. Paul Merrion, Boeing Closes in on Tanker, EADS Keeps up the Fight, CRAIN'S CHI. BUS., July 19,
2010 (quoting U.S. Rep. Dan Lipinski).
66. MOSHE SCHWARTZ, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 34026, DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS: How DOD
ACQUIRES WEAPON SYSTEMS AND RECENT EFFORTS TO REFORM THE PROCESS 1-2 (2010), available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL34026.pdf.
67. See discussion infra Part ll.B.1-3.
68. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-136 § 812, 117 Stat.
1392, 1543 (2003).
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"prime" contracts69 valued at greater than $25,000 revealed that the Department
of Defense procured less than one percent of defense components from foreign
sources.70 This small percentage is primarily due to the United States' complex
procurement policies and regulations.7 ' A large number of contracts within this
one percent, totaling $1.57 billion, consisted of technical aircraft, ship, and
munitions components. 72 Of significance, the contracts for these goods received
waivers of domestic preference regulations, including the Buy American Act.
7 3
Domestic preference regulations are meant to protect the U.S. industrial base
and national security,74 yet many of the goods receiving waivers were procured
from countries such as Bahrain, Canada, El Salvador, Germany, Jordan, and
United Arab Emirates. 75 The following sections describe the various acts,
regulations, and international agreements in place to govern U.S. procurement,
defense procurement, and in which circumstances waivers are given to foreign
contractors.
1. Buy American Act
76
A common set of domestic preference regulations are contained within the
Buy American Act. 7 Enacted in 1933, the central purpose of the Buy American
Act was to protect American jobs8 and wages during the Great Depression by
staving-off foreign competition.79 The Act requires federal agencies to prefer
American materials or products over foreign ones when buying these goods for
public use. 0 However, exceptions are made when 1) the cost of domestic goods
is unreasonable, 2) the goods purchased are for use outside of the United States,
69. Prime contractors are firms or individuals who enter into direct contract agreements with the
government. Subcontractors firms or individuals those who enter into direct contract agreements with prime
contractors to support prime contracts. Federal Acquisition Regulation 3.502-1 (2010) [hereinafter FAR].
70. OFFICE OF THE UNDER SEC'Y OF DEF., FOREIGN SOURCES OF SUPPLY FISCAL YEAR 2007 REPORT:
ANNUAL REPORT OF UNITED STATES DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE CAPABILITIES AND ACQUISITIONS OF
DEFENSE ITEMS AND COMPONENTS OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES ii (2008) [hereinafter FOREIGN SOURCES
2007 REPORT].
71. Gillian M. Marks & Norman J. Fry, Commercialization in Defense Sourcing and Other Responses to
Post-Cold War Defense Industry Transformation, 38 GEO. J. INT'L L. 577, 592 (2007).
72. FOREIGN SOURCES 2007 REPORT, supra note 70, at ii, 6.
73. See discussion infra Part H.B. 1.
74. REICH, supra note 46, at 2-5.
75. FOREIGN SOURCES 2007 REPORT, supra note 70, at 10.
76. Buy American Act, 41 U.S.C. § 10a-10d (2006).
77. See generally Laurence A. Knapp, The Buy American Act: A Review and Assessment, 61 COLUM. L.
REV. 430, 431 (1961).
78. Allis-Chalmers Corp., Hydro-Turbine Div. v. Friedkin, 635 F.2d 248, 257 (3d Cir. 1980).
79. Jaye Pershing Johnson, Guide to Federal Buy America Requirements, TCRP LEGAL RES. DIG.
(Transportation Research Board), Sept. 2001, at 4, available at http://onlinepubs.trb.org/onlinepubs/
tcrp/tcrpjrd_17.pdf.
80. 41 U.S.C. § 10a(a). Public use "shall mean use by, public building of, and public work of, the United
States." 41 U.S.C. § 10c(b).
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3) the purchase of domestic goods is inconsistent with public policy, or 4) the
contract award value is less than $2,500.81 While the Act does not entirely
preclude the procurement of public-use goods from foreign entities, 2 it has
produced the desired effect of granting a higher number of contracts to domestic
entities, albeit at some cost.
83
In purchasing foreign items for use by the Department of Defense, the most
common method of waiving the Buy American Act occurs when the items
procured will only be used outside of the United States. 4 Over the past few years,
the percentage of defense-related procurement from foreign suppliers receiving
this type of waiver ranged between forty-four to eighty-one percent. 5 The
reasoning behind this exception lies in the low cost and quick procurement and
transportation of certain foreign goods to support the localized armed forces.86
For example, under this exception, the U.S. Army can procure goods such as
fuel, food, and construction materials from Saudi Arabia for use in the wars in
Iraq and Afghanistan. Moreover, procurement from countries local to the
conflicts is safer than if the same goods were purchased from a U.S. domestic
87company.
In addition to the exemption for foreign use, agency leaders88 use the
"unreasonable price" exemption as a method to waive the Act. 9 Price
differentials are added to the base sum of a contract bid submitted by a U.S.
81. 41 U.S.C. §§ 10a(a), 428(b), 428(f) (explicitly exempting from the Buy American Act purchases
below the micro-purchases threshold amount of $2,500).
82. Id.
83. See REICH, supra note 46, at 36 (as a result of the number of contracts awarded to domestic entities,
the annual cost of the Buy American Act in the 1950s was over $200,000,000 due to higher procurement costs
and lost customs revenue).
84. OFFICE OF THE UNDER SEC'Y OF DEF., REPORT TO CONGRESS ON DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE FISCAL
YEAR 2009 PURCHASES FROM FOREIGN ENTITIES tbl.3 (2010) [hereinafter FOREIGN ENTITY 2009 PURCHASES]
(30,837 of 44,054 waivers of the Buy American Act were due to the goods' use outside the United States).
85. See FOREIGN ENTITY 2009 PURCHASES, supra note 84, at tbl.3; OFFICE OF THE UNDER SEC'Y OF
DEF., REPORT TO CONGRESS ON DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE FISCAL YEAR 2008 PURCHASES FROM FOREIGN
ENTITIES tbl.3 (2009) [hereinafter FOREIGN ENTITY 2008 PURCHASES]; FOREIGN SOURCES 2007 REPORT, supra
note 70, at 11. The current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan are the likely causes of the high number of waivers
granted under this exception. See FOREIGN ENTITY 2009 PURCHASES, supra note 84, at tbl.1 (listing high
number of contract actions awarded to Afghanistan, Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Turkey, and United Arab Emirates).
86. ROBERT M. FRIEDMAN, CIVILIAN CONTRACTORS ON THE BATTLEFIELD: A PARTNERSHIP WITH
COMMERCIAL INDUSTRY OR RECIPE FOR FAILURE? 12-13 (2002). For the dangers of transporting goods in the
Middle East wars and conflicts, see Olivia Hampton, Pentagon Going Green, Because It has to: Officials,
PHYSORG (Oct. 13, 2010), http://www.physorg.com/news/2010-10-pentagon-green.html (citing a September
2009 Army study that found one solider or civilian is killed for every twenty-four convoys carrying fuel to
bases in Iraq and Afghanistan).
87. Id. See also Pakistan Blocks NATO Supply Route to Afghanistan, NPR (Sept. 30, 2010),
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=130234301. But see discussion infra Part Ill.A.1-3,
discussing the consequences of such a reliance on foreign supplies, such as fuel, that are locally acquired near
where armed forces are engaged.
88. The Secretary of Defense is one example of an agency leader.
89. FOREIGN ENTITY 2009 PURCHASES, supra note 84, at 2.
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company. ° The sum of the base amount and the price differential is then
compared to bids submitted by foreign companies. 9' If that sum is greater than the
foreign contract bid, the domestic contract cost is deemed "unreasonable." 92 The
Department of Defense automatically uses a fifty percent price differential (also
called an "offset"),93  one of the highest price differentials in federal
procurement. 94 This high differential precludes nearly all foreign competition in
military or national-security related contracts.9
However, this price differential does not apply when comparing domestic
contract bids to those from Australia, Canada, and most of the European Union.9
The waiver of price differentials for these countries resulted from actions
performed by the U.S. Department of Defense after World War H, in which it
believed the strength of U.S. allies was critical to the national security of the
United States.97 By decreasing direct barriers to U.S. contracts, trade between
allies would increase and strengthen the allied nations against potential threats.98
2. Federal Acquisition Regulation & Defense FAR Supplement
In addition to the Buy American Act, federal acquisition procurement
contracts are governed and implemented by the complex Federal Acquisition
Regulation ("FAR"), which was established in the mid-1980s to provide
"uniform policies and procedures for acquisition by all executive agencies." 9
FAR is codified in Title 48 of the Code of Federal Regulations. It incorporates
domestic acts, such as the Buy American Act,'°° and international agreements and
treaties, including the World Trade Organization Government Procurement
Agreement. 101
The Defense FAR Supplement °2 expands on Federal government rules for
procurement performed by the Department of Defense."3 The Defense FAR
90. Textron, Inc. v. Adams, 493 F. Supp. 824, 831 (D.D.C. 1980).
91. Id.
92. REICH, supra note 46, at 12.
93. Defense FAR Supplement, supra note 61, § 225.105.
94. REICH, supra note 46, at 13.
95. Id. at 150.
96. Defense FAR Supplement, supra note 61, § 225.872-1. The list of countries currently excluded from
Buy American Act price differentials includes Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Egypt, Germany, Finland,
France, Greece, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
Turkey, and the United Kingdom.
97. Knapp, supra note 77, at 432.
98. Id. at 434.
99. FAR 1.101; KEYES, supra note 63, at 4.
100. Michael T. Janik, A U.S. Perspective on the GATT Agreement on Government Procurement, 20
GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 491, 519 (1987). The Buy American Act is codified as FAR subparts 25.1-
25.2.
101. FAR 225.403, 225.8.
102. 48 C.F.R. ch. 2 (2011).
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Supplement also implements reciprocal defense trade agreements, ' which the
United States forms with individual countries to increase collaboration of
military and defense technology.'05 Many of these trade agreements waive the
Buy American Act price differential,' °6 which lowers the barriers for foreign
companies to bid on U.S. contracts.
3. International Treaties and the Defense & National Security Exemptions
As a means to help govern the U.S. Government's contract activities in the
global market, the United States is a signatory to the main treaty that guides
global government procurement: General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade
("GATT")'0 7  and the subsequent World Trade Organization Plurilateral
Agreement on Government Procurement ("GPA").' °8 GATT was designed to
promote liberalized and expanded world trade practices,'9 specifically by
prohibiting, or at least, decreasing the incidents of foreign-discrimination
policies."" In doing so, the writers of GATT sought to increase transparency of
the contract bid and award process so that bidders could recognize the
specifications and procedures outlined by the government seeking solicitations."'
GAT requires the United States to waive Buy American Act requirements for
contracts that foreign companies may bid on, if those companies' governments
are also signatories of GAT."
2
In most of the international treaties and agreements, contracts related to
military arms, weapons, or other national security goods are exempt from the
guidelines agreed upon by the signatories.' '1 The exempting provision in GATT
103. SeeFAR 201.301(a)(1).
104. Reciprocal defense agreements are traditionally called "memoranda of understanding." Drew B.
Miller, Note, Is It Time to Reform Reciprocal Defense Procurement Agreements?, 39 PUB. CONT. L.J. 93, 98
(2009).
105. Id. at 93-94.
106. Defense FAR Supplement, supra note 61, § 225.872-1. The list of countries currently excluded
from Buy American Act price differentials includes Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Egypt, Germany,
Finland, France, Greece, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, Turkey, and the United Kingdom.
107. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-Il, 55 U.N.T.S. 194
[hereinafter GATT].
108. Agreement on Government Procurement, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex IV, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154.
109. Bernard M. Hoekman & Petros C. Mavroidis, Basic Elements of the Agreement on Government
Procurement, in LAW AND POLICY IN PUBLIC PURCHASING: THE WTO AGREEMENT ON GOVERNMENT
PROCUREMENT 13, 13-14 (Bernard M. Hoekman & Petros C. Mavroidis eds., 1997).
110. Janik, supra note 100, at 491.
111. Id. at 491-92.
112. Id.
113. See, e.g., GATr, supra note 107, art. XXI.
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lies in Article XXI(a)-(b), titled "Security Exceptions.""4 The exemption
precludes any requirement of a country to release information that, if disclosed,
would be detrimental to the country's national security interests."5 In addition,
GAT[ shall not be read to prevent a contracting country from performing an
action the country deems necessary for the protection of national security,
including actions related to the purchase of any goods or materials used for the
"military establishment.""' I
C. How Foreign Governments Address Defense Procurement
1. Current Climate of Defense Procurement Globalization"7
There is continual tension between the competing values of globalized trade
and domestic preference policies for defense-related goods. Benefits of
globalized competition include lowering the cost of goods, technological
specialization among nations, and improved productivity."" High-export
countries such as China, Germany, and Japan remain steadfast proponents of
open global trade to protect their interests in the global economy for all types of
goods." 9
However, as a result of the global financial crisis that began in 2008,
domestic preference policies have gained momentum in political discussions,
especially for goods related to national security and defense. 120 Many countries,
including the United Kingdom ("U.K."), United States, India, and France,
recognize the importance of maintaining sovereignty within their defense
industrial base.'2' In case of a war or major conflict, a country must to be able to
support its armed forces; and global politics surrounding the conflict may
threaten the international supply of goods and services required to sustain
114. GATT, supra note 107, art. XXI.
115. Id. at art. XXI(a).
116. Id. at art. XXI(b).
117. Globalization is the "growing economic interdependence of countries world-wide through the
increasing volume and variety of cross-border transactions in goods and services and of international capital
flows, and also through the more rapid and widespread diffusion of technology." TERRENCE R. GUAY,
STRATEGIC STUDIES INST., GLOBALIZATION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR THE DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE 1
(2007) (quoting International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook, 45 (May 1997)).
118. MARK A. MCLEAN, U.S. ARMY WAR COLL., DEFENSE PROCUREMENT STRATEGY FOR A
GLOBALIZED INDUSTRY 2 (2005).
119. See Global Trade War Feared as G-20 Talks Stall over Currency Dispute, Fox NEWS (Nov. 11,
2010), http://www.foxnews.com/worldV2010/11/1 1/global-trade-war-feared-g-talks-stall-currency-dispute.
120. See, e.g., Now U.S. Congress Buys Only "Made in America" Goods, supra note 43 (quoting
Congressman Larry Kissel in referring to requiring the U.S. Department of Homeland Security to buy only
goods made in the United States, "We can protect our American economy while also protecting our national
security and borders. The only way to ensure this is the case is to make these items right here at home.").
121. See infra Part H.C.2.
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military actions.'22 Some countries, especially those within the European Union,
have developed partnerships and defense contract preference policies among only
their closest allies,'23 assuming those allied supply lines will remain open during
military conflict. 4
2. Specific Examples of Foreign Government Defense Procurement Policy
The push towards globalization, not only commercially but in the defense
industry as well, has gained significant momentum in the last few decades.' This
section provides a background of the laws, policies, and practices of the
European Union and the U.K, which does not always enforce the same
procurement policies as the European Union. These two entities' defense
industries are the most comparable to that of the United States, and thus are






The underlying goals of the European Union are to encourage open trade
among its members, and defense items are no exception.2 s Due to decreasing
budgets and increased pressure to perform collaborative defense procurement
agreements among European Union members, many member states have
122. See, e.g., MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, DEFENCE INDUSTRIAL STRATEGY: DEFENCE WHITE PAPER, 2005,
Cm. 6697, at 7 (U.K.) [hereinafter U.K. 2005 DEFENCE WHITE PAPER] ("to maintain... the sovereign ability to
use our Armed Forces in the way we choose, we need particular industrial capabilities in the UK").
123. Hawkins, supra note 44, at 12. For example, while the European Union has a "Buy European"
protectionist policy, the environment is still collaborative within the community's individual countries.
124. Id. ("Such practices are considered safe because 'none of the identified foreign sources constitutes
a foreign vulnerability that poses a risk to national security."').
125. GUAY, supra note 117, at 2, 17.
126. Other countries, such as China, Russia, and India, have almost nothing in common with the U.S.
defense industry. China and Russia's defense industries, for example, are controlled by their governments. See
China's Military Modernization and U.S. Export Controls: Hearing Before the U.S.-China Econ. and Sec.
Review Comm'n (2006) (testimony of Roger Cliff, Senior Analyst, The RAND Corp.); Andrew Liaropoulos,
The Russian Defense Reform and Its Limitations, 2 CAUCASIAN REV. OF INT'L AFF. 42, 47 (2008). India is
similarly incomparable because India's defense industry is in its infancy stages compared to those of the United
States. See Defense Production and Procurement Policy out in January 2011; Drastic Steps for Indigenization
Promised, INDIA DEF. (Oct. 10, 2010), http://www.india-defence.com/reports-4775 (noting India imports more
than sixty-five percent of its defense goods). India relies heavily on foreign import of defense items. Id.
Therefore, defense acquisition policies and procedures of these and other similarly situated countries are not
included in the analysis.
127. Sue Arrowsmith, The Past and Future Evolution of EC Procurement Law: From Framework to
Common Code?, 35 PUB. CONT. L.J. 337, 339 (2006).
128. Christopher R. Yukins, The European Defense Procurement Directive: An American Perspective,
51 NO. 41 GOV'T CONTRACTOR 383 (2009) ("Under the new European defense directive, all but the most
sensitive defense and security procurements in Europe will have to be conducted under rules consistent with the
new directive.").
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awarded an increasing number of contracts to foreign, but intra-European
entities.129 The collaborative and synchronized nature of the European defense
strategy attempts to realize various objectives, including risk spreading, greater
technological innovation despite decreased research and development budgets,
and reduced unit costs."
Yet at the same time intra-Europe defense contracting has flourished,'3' U.S.
defense firms have been awarded a fewer number of defense contracts from
European governments.'32 From just 2000 to 2003, the dollar value of contracts
awarded by European governments to U.S. defense companies fell from $3.5
billion to a mere $1.4 billion. 33 Though the European Union encourages defense
procurement from other foreign firms, such firms are generally within the
European Union umbrella.'3 The policy has appropriately earned the nickname
"Buy European." 133
While European countries increasingly favor procuring defense goods from
within the European Union, European defense companies are looking outside of
the European Union to sustain their business.' 36 Specifically, European defense
companies hope to secure additional work from the U.S Department of Defense
to compensate for the deflating defense budgets within the European Union.'37




The United Kingdom's defense procurement market is one of the largest in
the world.'39 Recognizing the benefits of a competitive market, the United
Kingdom has worked for years to ensure its armed forces receive the best
products at a lower cost to tax payers by operating its defense procurement
129. See JEFFREY P. BIALOS, CHRISTINE E. FISHER & STUART L. KOEHL, FORTRESSES AND ICEBERGS:
THE EVOLUTION OF THE TRANSATLANTIC DEFENSE MARKET AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. NATIONAL
SECURITY POLICY 1, 13 (2009) [hereinafter FORTRESSES & ICEBERGS].
130. KJELL A. ELIASSEN, EUROPEAN DEFENCE PROCUREMENT AND INDUSTRIAL POLICY: THE CASE OF
FRANCE 13 (2002).
13 1. See FORTRESSES & ICEBERGS, supra note 129, at 13.
132. Hawkins, supra note 44, at I 1-12.
133. Id. This decrease remarkably occurred at the same time that the International Security Assistance
Forces began and were building operations in Afghanistan. History, INT'L SEC. ASSISTANCE FORCE:
AFGHANISTAN, http://www.isaf.nato.intlhistory.html (last visited Nov. 2, 2010). The International Security
Assistance Force: Afghanistan ("ISAF') was created in December 2001. NATO assumed leadership of ISAF in
August 2003, at which time operations were expanded.





139. U.K. 2005 DEFENCE WHITE PAPER, supra note 122, at 2.
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process as one of the most open to the global market.'4° The United Kingdom has
two main goals in preserving their defense industrial base: operational
sovereignty and specialized research and development spending in niche
technologies. 14 ' These two policies have resulted in the gradual retreat from
globalization. 42 The historic openness of defense procurement has closed slightly
over the last few years as the Ministry of Defence shifts its policies to ensure that
the United Kingdom retains an edge in certain technological niches "3 and
sustains its research and development base, while also maintaining operational
sovereignty.'44
One of the Ministry of Defence's growing concerns is maintaining
operational sovereignty, which is the delivery assurance of ongoing contracts and
the ability to maintain military readiness. 4 When deciding whether outsourcing
contracts will ensure operational sovereignty, the Ministry of Defence takes into
account international political negotiations, national security sensitivities,
freedom to conduct military operations, and global competition.'46
The second concern is maintaining technological innovation and
specialization within certain niches.' 47 While the U.K.'s Ministry of Defence still
desires to maintain sovereignty in the defense industry, it recognizes that it can
only do so within select niches of technology. 48 Therefore, although U.K.
defense companies invest heavily in the U.S. defense market, 49 the Ministry of
Defence is concerned that these investments will result in detrimental effects on
the United Kingdom's local defense base, especially when such investments
result in the off-shoring of research and development funds.5 The concern that
awarding additional contracts to U.S. companies would result in less U.K.
innovation, as well as losing operational sovereignty, 5' has led the United
Kingdom trending towards a closed defense market.
52
140. Id. at 15.
141. Id. at 15, 17, 76, 78, 92.
142. See FORTRESSES & ICEBERGS, supra note 129, at 25.
143. Some examples of niche technologies include: sensor algorithms, data fusion, knowledge-based
systems, armored fighting vehicles, and helicopter rotor blades. U.K. 2005 DEFENCE WHITE PAPER, supra note
122, at 15, 17, 76, 78, 92.
144. FORTRESSES & ICEBERGS, supra note 129, at 25.
145. U.K. 2005 DEFENCE WHITE PAPER, supra note 122, at 17.
146. Id.
147. See id. at 15-18.
148. Id. at 15, 16.
149. Id. at 26.
150. Id. at 27.
151. Id.
152. FORTRESSES & ICEBERGS, supra note 129, at 25.
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c. Why the United States' Defense Base Is Unparalleled
The defense acquisition and procurement policies of the European Union and
the United Kingdom may be considered when exploring options to weaken or
strengthen domestic preference policies in the United States. These policies exist
for defense industries that are dissimilar as compared to the industry in the
United States in both number and technological diversity of defense companies'53
and the size of military budgets. 
54
Though the European Union and their multinational defense industry is the
closest comparison to the United States, there are still significant differences
between the individual European countries that leave it difficult to compare the
policies of each with the United States. Not only does the United Kingdom spend
a fraction of what the United States does on defense goods,'55 but the United
Kingdom also has only one major domestic defense firm: BAE Systems.'5 6 The
United Kingdom therefore can only support its goal towards operational
readiness by ensuring it has control over certain niches in advanced technology, 7
whereas the United States has the industrial base to support technological
superiority and cradle-to-grave 5s solutions in all areas of the defense market.'59
The United Kingdom and other individual European countries must look outside
of their borders for defense goods because they cannot support the defense
industrial base within.'6 However, the United States has enough defense
companies to support the needs of the Department of Defense, and is therefore
the only country that is not required to look outside its borders to award defense
contracts. ,
The only valid comparison the United States has with any other country or
group of countries is that of the European Union. Like the United States, the
European Union has a number of European defense firms to procure from,
including EADS, BAE Systems, Finmeccanica, and Thales, all of which are
153. SUSAN T. JACKSON, THE SIPRI TOP 100 ARMS-PRODUCING COMPANIES IN 2008, at 2-5 (2010).
154. The 15 Countries with the Highest Military Expenditure in 2010 (table), STOCKHOLM INT'L PEACE
RES. INST., http://www.sipri.orgfresearch/armaments/milex/resultoutput/l5majorspenders (last visited May 28,
2011).
155. See id. In 2010, the United States is estimated to have spent $698 billion in military expenditures.
In contrast, the United Kingdom spent only $59.6 billion, less than nine percent of the United States.
156. JACKSON, supra note 153,at 2 (BAE Systems).
157. U.K. 2005 DEFENCE WHltIEPAPER, supra note 122, at 9.
158. In cradle-to-grave projects, all stages of the product's lifecycle are supported, including initial
system engineering and planning, manufacturing, testing, delivery, operation and maintenance, and finally the
disposal of the product. See generally DEF ACQUISITION UNIV., DEFENSE ACQUtSITION GUIDEBOOK 395
(2010).
159. U.K. 2005 DEFENCE WHITE PAPER, supra note 122, at 21 ("[N]o country outside the US can afford
to have a full cradle to grave industry in every sector.").
160. Id.
161. Id.
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within the top ten largest defense contractors in the world.'62 But the European
Union is experiencing massive military budget cuts. 63 These cuts are much more
extensive than those expected to occur in the United States.' 64 While the
European Union is highly encouraging of internal, multi-national cooperation
with defense contracts, this coordination stops at the continental borders.1 65 The
European Union may believe that to obtain military sovereignty, European-
preference policies should be used to guarantee that military contracts are
awarded to European companies, which will help not only individual countries
but the continent as a whole.' 66
The European Union uses some of the same domestic preference policies that
the United States itself enforces, such as price differentials and increased funding
for specific advanced technology. 67 However, these policies are not necessarily
followed by individual countries, including the United Kingdom
16 and France. 69
Thus, because the United States has an unparalleled defense industrial base to
support its armed forces, it stands out from the crowd as the only individual
country that can rely solely on domestic goods and can successfully enforce
domestic preference polices in military-related procurement contracts.'7°
The U.S. Government can learn from a certain few mistakes of European
countries, such as the United Kingdom's drive towards globalization that
weakened their own defense industrial base. 7' But the United Kingdom also has
162. JACKSON, supra note 153, at 2. The other top six listed defense contracting companies are U.S.
corporations.
163. See Hawkins, supra note 44, at 9 (stating that between 1989 and 2003, spending by England,
France, and Germany collectively fell twenty percent in real terms); John F. Bums, Britain Announces Severe
Military Cutbacks, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 2010, at A6.
164. British-Style Spending Cuts Would Shock U.S. Budget-But Could it Work?, Fox NEWS (Oct. 24,
2010), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2010/10/24/britains-spending-cuts-shock-budget-work/ (quoting Nile
Gardner) ("The Obama administration is showing no appetite whatsoever to do what the British are doing.").
165. Hawkins, supra note 44, at 12.
166. But see Reginald Dale, U.S. "Rigs" Tanker Bid: EU Doth Protest Too Much, TRANSATLANTIC MEDIA
BLOG (Mar. 18, 2010, 4:18 PM), http://transatlanticmedia.foreignpolicyblogs.com2010/03/18/us-%E2%80%
9Crigs%E2%80%9D-tanker-bid-eu-doth-protest-too-much/ (quoting German business paper Handelblatt) ("One thing
is certain: The common transatlantic defense market is little more than an illusion. In fact, Europe doesn't even really
have an open defense market .... The Germans, Brits, and French guard their domestic defense industries very
closely.").
167. See discussion supra Part Il.C.2.a-c. Similar policies include "Buy Domestic" preference in
contract awards, increased funding for niche technologies, and price differentials.
168. See discussion supra Part ll.C.2.b. The United Kingdom has a very open defense procurement
market, even more open than that of the European Union. However, they recognize the need for operational
sovereignty within certain technological niches. See also FORTRESSES & ICEBERGS, supra note 129, at 25.
169. Hawkins, supra note 44, at 9. One of France's recent Defense Ministers, Michele Alliot-Marie,
specifically identified the country's need for autonomy of their defense industrial base.
170. U.K. 2005 DEFENCE WHrrE PAPER, supra note 122, at 21 ("[N]o country outside the US can afford
to have a full cradle to grave industry in every sector.").
171. Seeid.at29.
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stark differences that would not allow the United States to accurately follow the
United Kingdom's drive towards a globalized defense procurement market.
III. WHY THE DEFENSE CONTRACT BIDDING PROCESS SHOULD FAVOR
DOMESTIC COMPANIES
When applying the cost benefit analysis of enforcing domestic preference
policies in defense contract awards, no single factor below should stand alone.'
72
The risk of harm to the U.S. national security is a paramount concern, but it
should not be examined in isolation.'73 Similarly, socioeconomic factors including
a contract's effect on the domestic industrial base, employment, and the risk of
the United States losing its technological edge must be weighed in a holistic
manner.'7 4 By analyzing these factors cumulatively, the U.S. Government will not
only ensure global military superiority, but will do so in a way that promotes
long-term goals of employment stability and prosperity.175
Many of these factors were at issue during the tanker bidding process though
precluded from consideration, in both the Second Attempt and Third Attempt.
The Second Attempt pitted two major U.S. defense corporations against each
other.' 76 The guaranteed win by a U.S. company would have alleviated many of
the concerns set forth by Congress. For the Third Attempt, however, there was no
assurance that the national security concerns would be satisfied. 77 Furthermore,
the Third Attempt contract, if it had been awarded to EADS, would no longer
support and create thousands of jobs for Americans.'78
A. Pulling the "National Security Risk Card'
79
Whether made during the peak of tensions during the Cold War or in the
years after the September 11 attacks, one of the most compelling reasons for
preferring domestic companies in defense-related contracts is to protect national
172. Mackenzie M. Eaglen & Eric Sayers, Maintaining the Superiority of America's Defense Industrial
Base, BACKGROUNDER (The Heritage Foundation), May 22, 2009, at 12.
173. See Hensel, supra note 18, at 50. National security should not be used lightly or as merely an
"excuse" to award a contract to a domestic company.
174. See Eaglen & Sayers, supra note 172, at 10.
175. See Hawkins, supra note 44, at 13.
176. Edmond Lococo & James Gunsalus, Boeing to Compete with Northrop for Air Force Tanker,
BLOOMBERG (Feb. 12, 2007, 6:09 PM), http://www.bloomberg.comlapps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=afHi
GABp6fQ8&refer=home.
177. See Hensel, supra note 18, at 53-54,
178. See id. at 46.
179. Brandon Hill, Boeing Pulls the "National Security Risk" Card with Air Force Tanker Bid, DAILY
TECH (May 26, 2010, 7:42 AM), http://www.dailytech.com/Boeing+Pulls+the+National+Security+Risk+Card
+with+Air+Force+Tanker+Bid/articlel8513.htm.
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security. ° "It is 'obvious and unarguable' that no governmental interest is more
compelling than the security of the Nation."'' There are specific national security
concerns driven by policy set forth by Congress, which states what the national
defense industrial base must be capable of:
(1) Supplying and equipping the force structure of the armed forces; (2)
Sustaining production, maintenance, repair, and logistics for military
operations of various durations and intensity; (3) Maintaining advanced
research and development activities to provide the armed forces with
systems capable of ensuring technological superiority over potential
adversaries; (4) constituting within a reasonable period the capability to
develop and produce supplies and equipment; (5) Providing for the
development, manufacture, and supply of items and technologies critical
to the production and sustainment of advanced military weapon systems
within the national technology and industrial base; and (6) Maintaining
critical design skills to ensure that the armed forces are provided with
systems capable of ensuring technological superiority over potential
adversaries.'82
Maintaining sovereignty of a defense industrial base by awarding contracts to
companies that align with U.S. defense policies helps to ensure these
congressional requirements are met.'83 However, there may be instances in which
awarding contracts to foreign entities, even those who are allies of the United
States, may destroy the U.S. armed forces' supply chain of goods, military
readiness, and superiority in times of war or national emergency. 84 Therefore, the
easiest way to achieve this objective is to award major defense acquisition and
procurement contracts to companies that are owned and operated within the
United States.
1. Withholding Defense Goods to Enforce Policy: "Security of Supply"'85
The continued supply of goods, including food, fuel, ammunition, and other
defense items critical to military success, remains a serious concern in the
ongoing conflicts in the Global War on Terror.'86 Too much reliance on a host
180. Hawkins, supra note 44, at 8.
181. Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307 (1981) (quoting Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 509
(1964)).
182. 10 U.S.C.A. § 2501(a)(1)-(6) (West 2009).
183. VALERIE B. GRASSO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 31236, THE BERRY AMENDMENT: REQUIRING
DEFENSE PROCUREMENT TO COME FROM DOMESTIC SOURCES 15 (2005).
184. Id. at 8-9, 15.
185. Hawkins, supra note 44, at 9.
186. See, e.g., Pakistan Blocks NATO Supply Route to Afghanistan, supra note 87.
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nation, or any foreign entity, to provide goods and services to the U.S. armed
forces may result in disrupted supply and consequently a weakened military
force.'87 As tensions escalated in Iraq in 2004, the United States found itself in the
precarious position of being short on supply of certain types of ammunition
precisely because the domestic production base was "maxed out.' '.. The U.S.
federal government was fortunate that it was able to import ammunition from
Canada and Israel. 9 If the United States or NATO had to rely on a less devoted
"ally," the results may have been vastly different.'9"
In relying on other countries for goods that directly support U.S. armed
forces, international politics may undermine immediate military goals.' 9' While
foreign support of the United States' campaign in the Middle East started high at
the beginning of the Global War on Terrorism, many countries have withdrawn
support from the NATO mission in Afghanistan.'92 Other countries' populations
have outright declared opposition to continued U.S. action in the country.' 93 If the
United States were dependent on defense supplies from such a country, or a
company headquartered in that country, the opposing country could potentially
limit the supply of goods as a means to enforce their own military or international
goals and policies.'94 Countries could use the military contract as a "bargaining
chip" for international conflicts or policies unrelated to the war. 95 By awarding
U.S. defense companies contracts that are critical to sustaining armed forces
campaigns around the world, the U.S. federal government would protect itself
from foreign policy exploitation.' 96 This concern is particularly relevant for the
tanker contract given the mission-critical aspects of the aging tankers currently
187. DEF. Sci. BD., supra note 45, at 18. See also FRIEDMAN, supra note 86, at 12-14.
188. Hawkins, supra note 44, at 10.
189. Id.
190. See, e.g., Pakistan Blocks NATO Supply Route to Afghanistan, supra note 87.
191. See MCLEAN, supra note 118, at 5 (citing a Swiss company refusing to sell components for bombs
to the United States due to Switzerland's policies regarding the war in Iraq).
192. France to Pull Troops Fighting Against Taliban in Afghanistan, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 18, 2006),
http://www.nytimes.con2006/12/18/world/asia/18afghan.html?_r=-l; Netherlands Confirms 2010 Afghanistan
Pullout, ABC NEWS (Dec. 19, 2007, 11:02 AM), http://www.abc.net.aulnews/stories/2007/12119/2122622.htm;
Switzerland Ends Military Mission in Afghanistan, SWIsSINFO (Feb. 23, 2008, 11:37 AM), http://www.swissinfo.
ch/eng/swiss news/Switzerland ends military..mission-inAfghanistan.hml?cid=6457084; Denmark to Begin
Pulling Troops from Afghanistan This Sununer, CHANNELNEWSASIA.COM (Feb. 23, 2011, 8:03 AM),
http://www.channelnewsasiacom/storiesafp-asiapacific/view/ll12446/l/.htnl. See also PEW RESEARCH CTR.,
GLOBAL UNEASE WITH MAJOR WORLD POWERS: 47-NATION PEW GLOBAL ATrruDES SURVEY 22,24 (2007). This
change in public support is due to differences in international policies between the United States and other countries. Id
at 20-21.
193. PEW RESEARCH CTR., supra note 192, at 24.
194. GRASSO, supra note 183, at 8.
195. KEYES, supra note 63, at 3. See, e.g., Reports: Russia Confirms Iran Missile Contract, USA TODAY
(Mar. 18, 2009, 9:41 AM), http://www.usatoday.connews/world/2009-03-18-russia-iran-missilesN.htm.
196. GRASSO, supra note 183, at 8-9. It is unlikely domestic companies would use contracts as
bargaining chips given their significant reliance on the U.S. Government for continued operations. See
discussion infra Part I11.B.2.
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used by the military.'97 The U.S. armed forces cannot be placed in a situation
where differences in policies between the United States and France seriously
limit the availability of the new tanker to support the ongoing conflicts in the
Middle East.
Another supply concern arises in long-term contracts. Many of the major
acquisitions contracts awarded by the U.S. Department of Defense are expected
to span years, if not decades, in operation and maintenance. 1" The Air Force
tanker contract, for example, is expected to include an additional $60 billion in
maintenance and parts over a period of ten to fifteen years to support the initial
tanker contract. 99 The risk of dependency on declining European defense
companies is a major long-term consideration in the continued operation and
maintenance of U.S. defense projects. ° If the U.S. Government were to award an
extensive and long-term contract to a foreign entity, not only are the concerns of
international politics triggered, but there is also an inherent risk that the foreign
company might dissolve.20'
The U.S. Government has some protection against this risk if it awards
contracts to U.S. companies.2  Whereas the United States has the power to
legally require domestic companies to stay in business in order to continue
supplying the Department of Defense with mission-critical components, 20 3 it
cannot exert such power over foreign entities.
Congress has also enacted measures over the last eighty years in an attempt
to stave off supply concerns, including the Buy American Act. 205 But these
measures often fall short of full protection of defense supplies because these acts
do not apply in a large number of situations or are often exempted. °6 For
example, the Buy American Act only applies to contracts carried out within the
197. 154 CONG. REC. S6,180-02 (daily ed. June 20, 2008) (statement of Sen. Patty Murray) ("Our aerial
refueling tankers-the ones we are talking about with this contract-are the backbone of our global military
strength."); see also GERTLER, supra note 3, at 7 (quoting Department of the Air Force) ("The KC-X remains
the Air Force's highest procurement and recapitalizing priority.").
198. THE INDUS. COLL. OF THE ARMED FORCES, PRIVATIZED MILITARY OPERATIONS INDUSTRY 17
(2008).
199. Hensel, supra note 18, at 51.
200. Hawkins, supra note 44, at 12.
201. Robert A. Borich, Globalization of the U.S. Defense Industrial Base: Developing Procurement
Sources Abroad Through Exporting Advanced Military Technology, 31 PUB. CONT. L.J. 623, 654 (2002).
202. DEF. SCI. BD., supra note 45, at 20-21.
203. But see David E. Sanger, For U.S. and Carmakers, Many Potential Pitfalls, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31,
2009, at A18 (arguing that previous attempts to bailout the steel and railroad industries were met "with little
success," and addressing additional issues arising from the U.S. Government's involvement with private
industries).
204. Borich, supra note 201, at 654. See also DEF. SCI. B.D., supra note 45, at 20-21 (citing a recent
example of the U.S. Government legally compelling a flat-panel display supplier to remain in business).
205. GRASSO, supra note 183, at 7. But see FRIEDMAN, supra note 86, at 19 (suggesting the high costs
associated with such a policy).
206. GRASSO, supra note 183, at 7.
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United States, and therefore, does not cover contracts performed in the current
war in Afghanistan. 07
2. Safety Measures and Quality Assurance
During a military conflict, it is imperative that the procurement of defense
goods is guaranteed) °a But the supply of defense items is moot if the items
themselves do not meet required quality standards.2°9 Over the last few years, the
U.S. Department of Defense has experienced a number of setbacks in receiving
defective or counterfeit components and goods that support the armed forces,
including fake computer chips bought by the U.S. Navy.20 The civilian sector has
also seen incidents involving faulty or defective goods. For example, consumers
have opened new iPods and audio CDs only to find computer viruses, Trojans,
and worms infecting their computers.2 1' And the defense industry is not immune
from similar incidents. The Congressional Research Service recently reported
that the Stuxnet virus, a computer worm that sent Iran's nuclear facilities
spiraling in late 2010, could be altered in order to attack similar facilities in the
United States. 21 2 If military-related items were procured from foreign nations,
there is the likelihood that foreign countries and companies could introduce
exploitation software to hinder U.S. defense efforts or to gain access to U.S.
defense systems.2 3 Thus, it is important to keep as much production and
manufacturing within the United States to ensure the safety and quality of
defense components.2 4
207. Id.
208. See discussion infra Part HI.A.1; see also Pakistan Blocks NATO Supply Route to Afghanistan,
supra note 87.
209. Borich, supra note 201, at 654 (citing the DoD's potential loss of control over system design,
performance, and cost when contracts are awarded to foreign suppliers).
210. Hsu, supra note 60. The fraudulent chips were shipped from China.
211. Users Compensated in Sony CD Row, BBC NEWS (Dec. 20, 2006, 14:05), http://news.bbc.co.uk/
2/hi/technology/6197107.stm; Robert Lemos, Apple Ships Virus on Some Video iPods, SEC. FOCUS (Oct. 18, 2006),
http://www.securityfocus.com/brief/332. The iPod was manufactured by Foxconn, a Chinese company. Inside Apple's
iPod Factories, MACWORLD (June 12, 2006), http://www.macworld.co.uk/newsf'mdex.cfm?NewsID- 14915.
212. Mark Clayton, Stuxnet "Virus" Could Be Altered to Attack U.S. Facilities, Report Warns,
CHRISTIAN SCt. MONITOR (Dec. 15, 2010), http://www.csmonitor.comUSA/2010/1215/Stuxnet-virus-could-be-
altered-to-attack-US-facilities-report-warns ("The resulting damage to the nation's critical infrastructure could
threaten many aspects of life, including the government's ability to safeguard national security interests....
Terrorist groups ... could potentially purchase or even rent a Stuxnet-based variant from organized crime
groups to launch an infrastructure attack on the US.").
213. See, e.g., id.
214. In addition, or alternatively, the U.S. Government can enforce more strict quality controls for any
imported goods that will be used as components in defense goods.
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3. Sensitive Technology, Classified Information, and Data Export Controls
In awarding defense-related contracts, an additional national security concern
is the release of classified information and technology. With the help of extensive
export controls, the U.S. Government has attempted to prevent the transfer of
sensitive technology and weaponry to foreign entities.2 5 But by awarding
contracts to foreign companies, even those that may only be subcontractors, the
relationship between the companies and the U.S. Government may result in the
release of sensitive information necessary for companies to complete the
contract. 26 This may result in the release of current or proposed U.S. capabilities
that could threaten the lives and safety of troops in the combat theater and
citizens at home.27
The U.S. Government limits companies from exporting products or sensitive
information to foreign entities." ' Furthermore, the United States has also
considered taking punitive measures against companies that export defense goods
and advanced technology to specific countries, like China.2 9 Thus, due to export
rules22° for the international use of U.S. defense information and technology, U.S.
defense companies must carefully review export laws before participating in a
foreign market to prevent the release of potentially sensitive technology.22'
Most of these export laws were established during the Cold War.22 During
this period, the United States enforced expansive export controls on sensitive and
215. John R. Liebman, Munitions Controls, in COPING WITH U.S. EXPORT CONTROLS 2005, 197, 201-
02, 204 (Evan R. Berlack & Christopher R. Wall eds., 2005). See also FAR 4.402; 32 C.F.R. § 2001.40,
2001.55 (2011) (governing the release of sensitive and classified information to foreign governments).
216. FED. RESEARCH Div., LIBRARY OF CONG., LAWS AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING THE PROTECTION
OF SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED INFORMATION 18 (2004) ("[Technical d]ata may also be disseminated without
permission to certain foreign recipients, and to other currently qualified U.S. contractors if the purpose for
dissemination is within the scope of certified legitimate business.").
217. See, e.g., Adam Levine, Top Military Official: WikiLeaks Founder May Have "Blood" on His
Hands, CNN (July 29, 2010), http://articles.cnn.com/2010-07-29/us/wikileaks.mullen.gates-l-julian-assange-
leak-defense-robert-gates?_s=PM:US.
218. See generally 22 U.S.C. § 2753 (2006).
219. Liebman, supra note 215, at 221. Other country-specific embargoes include Cuba, North Korea,
Iran, and Syria. For a comprehensive list of countries currently subject to embargoes for defense-related goods,
see Country Policies and Embargoes, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, http://www.pmddtc.state.gov/embargoed-
countries/index.html (last visited Feb. 3, 2011).
220. "No defense article or defense service shall be sold or leased by the U.S. Government under this
chapter to any country or international organization" unless the President consents to the transfer, the foreign
entity agrees that the defense item will only be used for legitimate self-defense, the foreign entity agrees to
protect the item to substantially the same degree as the U.S. Government would, and that the foreign entity is
otherwise authorized to receive the defense items (i.e. that the foreign entity is a "friendly nation"). 22 U.S.C. §
2753(a)(l)-(4).
221. See generally 22 U.S.C. § 2753.
222. KEYES, supra note 63, at 4; Peter Lichtenbaum, National Security, Trade and Investment, in
COPING WITH U.S. EXPORT CONTROLS 2005, supra note 215, at 313, 322 ("Extensive licensing requirements
applied to exports in order to ensure that commodities and technology would not be diverted to the Soviet
Bloc.").
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defense-related goods, technology, and information based on national security
concerns over the rise of communism.2 If the United States strictly adhered to
the export control and licensing requirements, it was less likely for the Soviet
Union to learn of the United States' technological "edge." '24 The goal of the Cold
War export controls was simple: limit the transfer of materially useful military
technology to the U.S.S.R. in case of a prospective World War 111.225 While some
of these concerns still linger today,226 especially in the context of international
terrorism, 27 they are no longer the only concerns considered by the U.S.
228Government in determining the policies of defense-related exports.
Interestingly enough, export control policies do not only apply to transferring
goods outside of the United States.2 9 The United States also has in place
numerous laws, regulations, and policies limiting the release of sensitive defense,
military, and national security information to foreign entities.3 Specifically, the
Secretary of Defense reserves the right to withhold any sensitive information
from public release, including the release of information to foreign nationals
present in the United States,23' if the information or data is not exportable under
223. See Lichtenbaum, supra note 222.
224. Id. at 322 ("Extensive licensing requirements applied to exports in order to ensure that commodities
and technology would not be diverted to the Soviet Bloc.").
225. Noah J. Richmond, The Wassenaar Arrangement and Its Implementation in Europe, in EXPORT
CONTROLS AND THE U.S. DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE app. E, at E-1 (2007); Paul Collopy, Impact of U.S.
Export Controls on the U.S. Machine Tool Industry, in EXPORT CONTROLS AND THE U.S. DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL
BASE app. C, at C-24 (2007) ("In the cold war, the West was outnumbered in soldiers and conventional
equipment by the Eastern Bloc. The US pursued a strategy of maintaining a one or two generation lead in
critical technologies to compensate for the deficiency in quantity. Our superior technology would provide kill
ratios that would balance out the enemy's tanks and troops. Midway through the cold war, US thinking evolved
toward believing that protecting manufacturing know-how was more critical than protecting the design of
weapon systems themselves. A technology lead in manufacturing technology was critical to securing the
nation.").
226. And albeit in a less dramatic manner. See Jeremy Page, A Chinese Stealth Challenge?, WALL ST. J.
(Jan. 5, 2011), http://online.wsj.comlarticle/SB 1000 1424052748703808704576061674166905408.htnl?mod=
WSJ_WSJ_NewsBlogsModule (noting that China for years reverse engineered Russian technology).
227. Tom Bowman, Thousands of U.S.-Bought Weapons Lost in Iraq, NPR (Oct. 30, 2006),
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=6407177 (noting that the United States cannot account
for thousands of weapons in Iraq, and that such weapons could end up in the hands of insurgent terrorists).
228. See Lichtenbaum, supra note 222, at 322 (stating the U.S. Government export policies must take
into account economic concerns, especially now that there is no longer a consensus among Western countries
that communism is a "monolithic and direct threat").
229. Id.; see also, FAR 4.402; 32 C.F.R. §§ 2001.40, 2001.55 (2011) (governing the release of sensitive
and classified information to foreign governments).
230. See, e.g., FAR 4.402; 32 C.F.R. §§ 2001.40, 2001.55 (governing the release of sensitive and
classified information to foreign governments).
231. See Exec. Order No. 12968 § 2.6, 60 Fed. Reg. 40,245 (Aug. 2, 1995) (ordering that foreign
nationals may be granted limited access to classified material in limited circumstances, and only "where there
are compelling reasons in furtherance of an agency mission." In addition, such "individuals shall not be eligible
for access to any greater level of classified information than the U.S. Government has determined may be
releasable to the country of which the subject is currently a citizen.").
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various provisions of law. 3 2 The "export" of defense items and information to
foreign nationals233 located within the United States is also a concern,234 especially
after the September 11 attacks.2 35 Foreign nationals may repatriate sensitive
technology to their home country unbeknownst to the United States.23 6
Alternatively, terrorists operating within U.S. borders may exploit the access and
use of these materials to conduct attacks against the United States or its allies. 37
Many of the sensitive technology and export control concerns involved with
the Air Force tanker were at least partially mitigated when EADS was partnered
with Northrop Grumman.238 In the Second Attempt, the bid proposal by the two-
company team stated that all classified technology would be installed by
Northrop Grumman after the aircraft assembly was completed in the United
States, ensuring that EADS would not handle any of the classified items.239 Once
Northrop Grumman dropped out of the race for the Third Attempt, the concern
that sensitive technology could fall into the wrong hands arose again." °
Moreover, Congress raised the question of who would perform the job of
installing the sensitive technology: foreign individuals or U.S. citizens? 24'
B. Protectionism and Economics
Protecting jobs is one of the most common reasons cited for implementing
domestic preference policies, especially for the defense industry. But other
economic arguments support preferring domestic companies in military
232. 10 U.S.C. § 130(a) (2006). Items and data may include "blueprints, drawings, plans, instructions,
computer software and documentation, or other technical information that can be used, or be adapted for use, to
design, engineer, produce, manufacture, operate, repair, overhaul, or reproduce any military or space equipment
or technology concerning such equipment." § 130(c). A D.C. Circuit case involved one example of a court
recognizing the valid withholding of detailed naval torpedo schematics from public release. Colonial Trading
Corp. v. Dep't of Navy, 735 F. Supp. 429, 431 (D.D.C. 1990).
233. Including researchers at academic and government institutions and within the private industry.
Lichtenbaum, supra note 222, at 323.
234. Id.
235. See id. (stating that the United States is facing "a particular threat today from terrorist groups, who
may be operating within our borders," much like the 9/11 terrorists were).
236. Id.
237. Id. (illustrating the importance and effect of foreign nationals on the U.S. national security).
238. Tran, supra note 32 (quoting EADS Chairman Louis Gallois) ("If we want to stay in, we would
have to find another American partner, because there is some extremely sensitive equipment in that plane which
we can't supply.").
239. Hensel, supra note 18, at 54.
240. Hill, supra note 179.
241. See Gordon Lubold, Congress, Boeing Riled by Huge Defense Contract for Foreign Firm,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Mar. 7, 2008), http://www.csmonitor.comlUSA/Military/2008/030
7/pO 2 sOl-
usmi.html (quoting U.S. Sen. Patty Murray) ("We are hemorrhaging manufacturing jobs to foreign countries
already, so I cannot imagine why ... our government would decide to take 44,000 American jobs, good jobs,
and give them to the Europeans.").
242. REICH, supra note 46, at 27.
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contracts.243 For instance, one argument is that awarding defense contracts to
domestic companies provides revenue that will, both directly and indirectly, '4 be
returned to U.S. taxpayers and consequently stimulate the U.S. economy.245
Protecting sensitive and advanced technology is another common economic
reason to enforce domestic preference policies, as the release (or export) of
sensitive technology could seriously detriment the United States' competitive and
technological superiority in the defense industry. 46 If U.S. defense companies
lose the technological edge they currently have over foreign companies, both the
U.S. defense companies and civilian companies alike will no longer be as
competitive in the domestic or global market, causing further decline in the U.S.
economy from lost sales. 47  While other industries may be harmed by
protectionist policies,7 the defense industry is the best candidate for
implementing and enforcing economic-related policies that prefer domestic
companies in major defense procurement contracts because this industry is
heavily dependent on government funding.9  While a functioning government
still exists, the government will need defense goods to protect the country from
foreign threats. Accordingly, as long as the U.S. Government remains, so will a
market for defense goods.
1. Protecting Technology
a. Encouraging High Levels of Innovation
The defense industry has some of the most advanced technology of any
industry within the United States.250 The advanced technology seen in the military
243. Id. at 4-5.
244. An example of direct revenue return occurs where the tax revenue is used to purchase goods from a
domestic source that employs a taxpaying individual. An example of indirect revenue return exists where a
domestic company receiving defense contracts uses its revenues to conduct independent research and
development or fund charitable organizations that benefit local communities.
245. See RETCH, supra note 46, at 4.
246. See MCLEAN, supra note 118, at 4-7.
247. See NORTHROP 2009 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 23, at 10 ("Our success in the competitive
defense industry depends upon our ability to develop and market our products and services, as well as our
ability to provide the ... technologies ... needed to deliver those products and services with maximum
efficiency."); id. at 12 ("Our future success depends, in part, on our ability to develop new products and new
technologies... If we fail to maintain our competitive position, we could lose a significant amount of future
business to our competitors.").
248. See, e.g., REIcH, supra note 46, at 27 (listing examples in which protectionist policies may harm
the economy or industrial base, as well as a sample of industries that may thrive on such policies, including
energy, defense, transportation, and telecommunications).
249. See id. Other industries that may benefit from, instead of be harmed by, protectionist policies are
those that "produce mainly for the government market, such as energy, defense, transport, and
telecommunications." Id.
250. DEF. SCI. BD., supra note 45, at 22.
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has been funded for decades by the federal government both directly via
specified contracts, and indirectly as companies invest profits from contract
awards in innovation.25" ' By preferring U.S. companies for defense contracts, the
revenue and profits derived from these contracts can be used for in-house
research and development.252 Among the top five defense companies in the
United States, the average annual spending on independently-funded defense-
related research and development was $710 million in 2009.253 Boeing alone
spent over $1 billion in 2009.2' 4 The creation of new technologies increases a
company's global dominance and additional offerings for the U.S. armed
forces 55
New military technology can help the domestic civil sector as well.256
Industry-wide innovation abounds in the entire economy when contracts are
awarded to companies that use the most advanced technologies.257 Often,
companies awarded the contracts are able to use similar advanced technology in
the civilian market.2s The federal government, therefore, subsidizes the
manufacturing base by not only providing direct financial support to the
production of goods via contracts, but also by indirectly supporting the overall
259
economy by encouraging innovation within the civilian sector.
A competitive contract process is necessary to encourage high levels of
innovation in the defense industry.26° But that competition need not come from
251. See, e.g., RAYTHEON CORP., RAYTHEON 2009 ANNUAL REPORT 11 [hereinafter RAYTHEON 2009
ANNUAL REPORT], available at http://phx.corporate-ir.net/Extemal.File?item=UGFyZW50SUQ9NDE5NDF8
Q2hpbGRJRDOtMXxUeXB1PTM=&t=I (differentiating between independently-funded research and
development and that which was funded directly by the U.S. Government).
252. Id.
253. See LOCKHEED MARTIN CORP., 2009 ANNUAL REPORT 10 [hereinafter LOCKHEED 2009 ANNUAL
REPORT], available at http://www.lockheedmartin.comldata/assets/corporate/documents/ir/20 10/2009-Annual-
report.pdf ($750M); Press Release, Boeing Corp., Boeing Reports Strong 2009 Revenue & Cash Flow on Solid
Performance, at 13 (Jan. 27, 2010), available at http://www.boeing.com/news/releases/2010/ql/l00l127a-nr.pdf
($110 1M); NORTHROP 2009 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 23, at 8 ($610M); GENERAL DYNAMICS CORP.,
GENERAL DYNAMICS ANNUAL REPORT 2009, at 40, available at http://phx.corporate-ir.net/Extemal.File?
item=UGFyZW50SUQ9MzczNTQIfENoaWxkSUQ9MzcxMzQOfFR5cGU9MQ==&t=I ($520M); RAYTHEON
2009 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 251, at I I ($565M).
254. Press Release, Boeing Corp., supra note 253, at 13.
255. See NORTHROP 2009 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 23, at 10 ("Our success in the competitive
defense industry depends upon our ability to develop and market our products and services, as well as our
ability to provide the ... technologies.., needed to deliver those products and services with maximum
efficiency.").
256. See, e.g., Tom A. Peter, Military Inventions Hit the Civilian Market, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR
(June 19, 2008), http://www.csmonitor.comInnovation/Tech-Culture/2008/0619/built-for-battle-but-perfect-in-
peacetime.
257. REICH, supra note 46, at 4.
258. Peter, supra note 256 ("After more than five years, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have begun to
leave their footprint on science history, generating everything from thermal imaging devices to video-game-like
training platforms that are already trickling into daily life."). See also REICH, supra note 46, at 16.
259. REICH, supra note 46, at 16.
260. JEREMIAH GERTLER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 30563, F-35 JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER (JSF)
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foreign companies; there are sufficient competitors in the U.S. domestic defense
industry to provide the federal government an abundant of suppliers to choose
from.21 "Where demand from a national customer can sustain only one or two
national firms, the participation of foreign competitors can help sustain a
competitive framework and the innovation ... it can bring.2 62 Because the U.S.
Government is able to sustain a large number of national companies, including
seven of the top ten defense companies in the world,' the influx of foreign
competition may not provide a meaningful increase of real competition that
would result in greater levels of innovation. Competition for U.S. Department of
Defense contracts remains fierce between domestic companies because the
United States has an unrivaled breadth and depth of choices in domestic
companies.2" In terms of top global defense companies, the U.S. Government has
more options in choosing a domestic company for a defense-related contract than
that of the European Union.2 As a result, whereas the European Union countries
must look outside their borders to other European firms to engage in any
meaningful competition, the U.S. Government has the equivalent of its own
"European Union" of companies to select from when awarding defense contracts.
b. How Export Controls Go Hand in Hand with Procurement Policy
In addition to encouraging the development of new technology, the U.S.
Government can protect its current technological edge by the continued
enforcement of export controls. Sensitive or advanced technology transfer has
always been a concern of the Department of Defense.2  While rules and
regulations control the export of these goods to foreign entities, the United States
loses effective control over continued or further dissemination once the
technology has been transferred to a foreign company or if the item is
267manufactured overseas. The possibility that the U.S. Government may lose
control of goods once they have left U.S. shores means the strict adherence of
PROGRAM: BACKGROUND AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 48 (2009).
261. U.K. 2005 DEFENCE WHITE PAPER, supra note 122, at 25 ("US companies continue to dominate the
global defence industry ... 7 out of the top 10 defence companies are now US-based.").
262. FORTRESSES & ICEBERGS, supra note 129, at 11. The report cites a national security caveat to
supplementing national competition for defense contracts with foreign entities.
263. GUAY, supra note 117, at 7-8. Other studies show that at least seven of the top ten worldwide
defense companies are based in the United States, however the individual ranking of each of those companies
differs slightly depending on the year the study was conducted and the exact financial figures used. See, e.g.,
U.K. 2005 DEFENCE WHITE PAPER, supra note 122, at 26; JACKSON, supra note 153, at 2.
264. JACKSON, supra note 153, at 2; U.K. 2005 DEFENCE WHITE PAPER, supra note 122, at 25 ("the
defence industrial, technological, and military gap between the USA and the rest of the world continues to
grow").
265. U.K. 2005 DEFENCE WHITE PAPER, supra note 122, at 26 (seven of the top ten global defense
companies are in the United States, whereas Europe only has three).
266. MCLEAN, supra note 118, at 6.
267. Id. at 7.
2011 /Foreign Competition in U.S. Defense Contracts
export laws for contracts won by foreign companies may not be effective in
controlling advanced or sensitive technology. Indeed, Boeing expressed concern
to lawmakers in 2006 that EADS had an unfair advantage because EADS would
not be subject to the same, strict export controls as Boeing. 6 This suggests that
EADS would not be subject to penalties for releasing sensitive technology to the
detriment of the United States. On the other hand, if the contract were awarded
to Boeing, the domestic company would have increased incentive to protect such
technology .270
This loss of technology, and loss of the knowledge and skills necessary to
create it, not only undermines domestic companies' strategic advantage in the
global marketplace, but may also result in the technology ending up in the hands
of U.S. adversaries.2 7 ' Numerous examples exist where China and other military-
based rivals have reverse engineered U.S. defense technology, including
components of the U.S. Air Force F-16 jet fighter aircraft.72 By exploiting
defense technology, U.S. adversaries can significantly alter international military
strategies, as well as harm U.S. national security by using the exploited
technology against U.S. assets and personnel domestically and abroad. 73
2. Protecting Jobs: Avoiding the Outsourcing of American Jobs
In its Second Attempt, the Air Force awarded the tanker contract to the
partnership of EADS and Northrop Grumman. 4 In that partnership, Northrop
Grumman stated that the United States could expect the creation or support of
48,000 jobs. 5 This number was similar to what Boeing promised. 76 After the
268. Tanker-Contest Fairness Concerns Boeing CEO, SEATTLE TIMES (July 19, 2006), http://
seattletimes.nwsource.comlhtml/businesstechnology/2003136325_mcnerneyl9.html (quoting James McNerney,
Boeing Corp. Chief Executive) ("[EADS has] to jump through far fewer hoops. If they have a legal entity in this
country soliciting defense business ... they should follow the same business transparency laws as we do.").
269. See id.
270. See id.
271. MCLEAN, supra note 118, at 6-7 (in discussing the undesirable transfer of technology to People's
Liberation Army (PLA) of China, Richard Fisher of the Center for Security Policy stated, "Once the EU
embargo [with China] is lifted, it can be expected that many European defense companies that now cooperate
with U.S. defense companies will seek cooperative alliances with PLA-controlled companies. Such moves
should be viewed with concern in Washington as these alliances could prove to be very useful avenues for
future PLA espionage against U.S. defense technology.").
272. ld. at 7-8.
273. See Page, supra note 226 (noting that China for years reverse engineered Russian technology, and
also noting the likelihood of bolstered concerns "among U.S. officials and politicians about China's military
modernization."); see also supra Part I.A.3.
274. Northrop Grun'nan's Sugar Wins Sweet Air Force Deal, FORBES (Feb. 29, 2008, 6:00 PM),
http://www.forbes.conV2008/02/29/northrup-grumman-tankers-face-markets-cx-pmO229autofacescanO4.htm].
275. Press Release, Northrop Grumman Corp., Northrop Grumman Updates Job Projections for Air
Force KC-45A Tanker Program (Mar. 11, 2008), available at http://www.irconnect.comlnoc/press/pages/
newsreleases.html?d=138001.
276. Press Release, Boeing Corp., Boeing Submits Final KC-767 Advanced Tanker Proposal to U.S. Air
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partnership between EADS and Northrop Grumman dissolved, EADS continued
to tout that the same number of jobs would be created if the U.S. Government
awarded the contract to it instead of Boeing. 7 Congress questioned whether this
job figure was feasible, given that the company planned to build many of the
components in Europe with only the final assembly to be completed in the United
States.278
The importance of job creation and keeping jobs within the United States has
been at the forefront of the Air Force tanker contest, especially after Northrop
Grumman dropped out of the race.19 At a time when the manufacturing and
industrial bases have decreased precipitously 280 within the United States due to
companies transferring plants to developing countries where manufacturing costs
are much lower,8 ' it remains crucial to maintain at least some level of an
282industrial base within the United States. The industrial base not only ensures
operational sovereignty in case of military conflict,28 3 but also provides an
opportunity to develop a skilled labor force to the public.28 The defense industry
Force (Jan. 3, 2008), available at http://www.boeing.com/news/releases/2008/ql/080103bnr.html
("Nationwide, the program will support 44,000 American jobs and 300 suppliers.").
277. Press Release, European Aeronautic Defence & Space Co., EADS North America Prepares to Build
KC-45 Tanker Production Facility in Mobile, Alabama (Dec. 8, 2010), available at http:l/www.eads.
comleads/int/ennews/press.3ee9b56b-5571-47ee-8bde-f7b89256ce5f.70472f39-dd6f-4428-a792-
9ld82cb9791b.html ("The KC-45 will create or support 48,000 American jobs across the country.").
278. See Lubold, supra note 241 (quoting U.S. Sen. Patty Murray) ("We are hemorrhaging
manufacturing jobs to foreign countries already, so I cannot imagine why ... our government would decide to
take 44,000 American jobs, good jobs, and give them to the Europeans."); Christopher Drew, European Plane
Maker Submits Bid for U.S. Tanker, N.Y. TIMES (July 8, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/09/
business/09tanker.html. In its final proposal revision for the Third Attempt tanker contract, EADS continued to
state its successful bid would support 48,000 jobs in the United States. Press Release, European Aeronautic
Defence & Space Co., EADS North America Responds to Air Force Request for Final Proposal Revisions in
Tanker Competition (Feb. 10, 2011), available at http://www.eads.com/eads/int/en/news/press.50b5921e-5cfe-
41 dc-81 ld-ObcOfe866 Iea.70472f39-dd6f-4428-a792-9 d82cb9791b.html.
279. Jordan Schrader, Unemployment, Boeing Unions Take Lead Roles in Senate Campaign, OLYMPIAN
(Sept. 12, 2010), http://www.theolympian.com/2010/09/12/1366636/unemployment-boeing-unions-take.html;
Northrop Grumman Drops Out of Tanker Race, WIBW.CoM (Mar. 8, 2010, 6:15 PM), http://www.
wibw.com/home/headlines/86998312.html.
280. MCLEAN, supra note 118, at 6 ("With respect to workers, globalization of markets has led to many
lost U.S. jobs. Congressional leaders point to a loss of... 2.4 million [manufacturing jobs] lost in the United
States between 1998 and 2003.").
281. See GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, OFFSHORING OF SERVICES: AN OVERVIEW OF THE ISSUES 5-
6,9(2005).
282. See id.; FORTRESSES & ICEBERGS, supra note 129, at 25; U.K. 2005 DEFENCE WHITE PAPER, supra
note 122, at 17.
283. See FORTRESSES & ICEBERGS, supra note 129, at 25; U.K. 2005 DEFENCE WHITE PAPER, supra
note 122, at 17.
284. See, e.g., NORTHROP 2009 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 23, at 10 ("Our ability to successfully
compete in the information and services markets depends on a number of factors; most important is the
capability to deploy skilled professionals.... Accordingly, we have implemented various workforce initiatives
to ensure our success in attracting, developing and retaining sufficient resources to maintain or improve our
competitive position within these markets.").
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is the perfect place to create and maintain long-term manufacturing, mechanical,
scientific, and engineering jobs for a number of reasons, including the longevity
and sensitive nature of defense contracts. The necessary security clearances to
work on many of these large-scale defense contracts often require U.S.
citizenship. 5 Indeed, the defense industry is perhaps one of the few industries
where protectionist policies would actually help maintain employment levels for
286these reasons.
This anomaly in protectionism analysis stems from the nature of the United
States' defense industry, which is based on major companies and corporations
deriving most of their revenue from the federal government itself.287 In its 2009
Annual Report, Northrop Grumman stated it depended "heavily on a single
281customer, the U.S. Government, for a substantial portion" of its business. In
fact, close to ninety-two percent of Northrop Grumman's 2009 revenues were
derived from the U.S. Government.29 Northrop Grumman also expressed concern
that increased competition from foreign and international firms may significantly
reduce its revenues and market share,29° and negatively impact its ability to
provide goods and services to the U.S. Government using U.S. employees. 29' Like
Northrop Grumman, U.S. defense corporation Lockheed Martin derives eighty-
292
five percent of its revenue from federal government contracts. Based on the
heavy reliance on government contracts, receiving future defense contracts is
imperative for the continuance of these companies.
Companies like Northrop Grumman and Lockheed Martin may not survive if
a major portion of those revenues and profits were shipped offshore. If, as in the
case of the Air Force tanker contract, a domestic company were to lose a future
contract to a foreign company, not only would thousands of jobs be lost to other
countries in the short term,293 but for large-scale contracts that span decades,
those jobs would be lost forever.294 The loss of major contracts would furtherhinder the domestic defense industry's ability to compete both domestically and
285. See GUAY, supra note 117, at 52-54.
286. REICH, supra note 46, at 27.
287. Id.
288. NORTHROP 2009 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 23, at 10.
289. Id.
290. Id. at 12.
291. See id. at 10 (noting that one of the most important factors is the "capability to deploy skilled
professionals, many requiring security clearances," which often are only available to U.S. citizens); see also
Security Clearance Jobs, CLEARANCEJOBS (Sept. 9, 2010, 4:57 PM), http://www.clearancejobs.com/faq-
pro/index.php?action=article&catid--014&id=42&lang=.
292. LOCKHEED 2009 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 253, at 4. By contrast, only half of Boeing's
business is based on U.S. Government contracts because Boeing has a large civilian component responsible for
building civilian aircraft for worldwide customers. Press Release, Boeing Corp., supra note 253, at 3-4, 7.
293. See generally GUAY, supra note 117, at 52-53. Due to the sensitive nature of many defense
contracts, U.S. domestic defense companies realistically prefer U.S. citizens in hiring because domestic
citizenship is required for various security clearances. Security Clearance Jobs, supra note 291.
294. See generally MCLEAN, supra note 118, at 6.
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globally as a result of lost revenue, profits, research and development funding,
and an employment base, further eroding the strategic advantage companies such
as Northrop Grumman and Lockheed Martin maintain.295 Preferring domestic
corporations (like Boeing) for the award of large-scale acquisition contracts (like
the tanker contract) ensures that the U.S. defense industrial base will remain
intact, including the hundreds of thousands of jobs that support it, especially
when defense budgets are decreasing at staggering rates throughout the world.296
3. Protectionism in an Economic Crisis: Keeping the Dollars Within
Borders
Less funding and contracts are available for the companies supporting the
world's militaries primarily due to the economic crisis that reverberated
throughout the world in the late 2000s.297 U.S. defense companies remain
concerned that global competition, the European defense market favoring
European companies such as EADS and BAE, and the decline of foreign defense
budgets, will significantly decrease revenues and profits from foreign entities.9
Given these concerns, the U.S. Government should not send large profits and
revenues to foreign competition when the demand for defense goods is shrinking
both globally and domestically. 299 The scarcity of demand may lead the defense
market to shrink at a rate similar to that after the Cold War, which could result in
fewer jobs for U.S. workers and less competition within the United States. °°
To help offset the potential loss of U.S. employment and profits for U.S.
defense companies, the U.S. Government can add price differentials, or
premiums, via the Buy American Act to the base bid amount of foreign
competitors.3 ' However, because these premiums are often not used when
foreign competitors are allied governments,0  the premium polices used to help
295. Id.
296. Hawkins, supra note 44, at 9 (stating that between 1989 and 2003, spending by England, France,
and Germany collectively fell twenty percent in real terms); Burns, supra note 163.
297. See, e.g., NORTHROP 2009 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 23, at 11. But see Ben Blanchard & Chris
Buckley, China Says Defense Spending Rise Slows to 7.5 Percent, REUrERS (Mar. 4, 2010, 9:02 AM),
http://www.reuters.comarticle/2010/03/04/us-china-parliament-defence-idUSTRE623A720100304 (noting that
China is still increasing military spending by seven and one-half percent).
298. See, e.g., NORTHROP 2009 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 23, at 12.
299. See Lubold, supra note 241 (quoting Sen. Patty Murray) ("Instead of securing the American
economy and our military while we are at war, we are creating a European economic stimulus plan.").
300. Hawkins, supra note 44, at 10 ("Over one million jobs were lost in defense-related sectors,
hundreds of companies left the business, and a major consolidation took place among the largest contractors.").
301. See discussion supra Part l.B. I.
302. FOREIGN SOURCES 2007 REPORT, supra note 70, at 11. A number of contracts were awarded to the
United Kingdom and Germany, both of which house some of the world's top ten defense companies, including
BAE Systems and EADS. Id. at 10.
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offset job losses within the U.S. defense industry are essentially ineffective
methods of defense industrial base preservation.0 3
When comparing bids between U.S. and foreign companies, the U.S.
Government should also take into account the various subsidies that foreign
companies receive from their respective governments. This concern is especially
relevant for companies based in Europe, whose governments provide subsidies
called "launch aid" to help individual companies gain a competitive bidding
edge.3°4 Many countries provide subsidies directly to domestic companies to help
"launch" new products, including subsidies to support a new aircraft designed by
Airbus (a subdivision of Boeing's main competitor, EADS).0 5 The government
subsidies, and similar financial support in the form of long-term loans, help
foreign companies bid at lower rates than non-subsidized companies' 6 Boeing
claims that the subsidies provided to Airbus are a major reason the company has
surpassed Boeing in both domestic and global dominance in the civilian aircraft
sector, which has resulted in domestic job layoffs.0 7
In preferring U.S. defense companies over subsidized foreign companies, the
U.S. Government would be leveling the playing field with foreign competition.3 8
With the help of launch aid, foreign corporations are able to bid at lower prices,
but they should not be rewarded for undercutting the bid price, and the foreign
companies' bid price should be adjusted accordingly.3 9 In awarding contracts to
U.S. companies, profits and revenue earned would be analogous to foreign
subsidies, as many U.S. defense corporations use profits for internal research and
development, technological innovation, and testing and development.1 These
same activities are conducted by non-U.S. corporations using foreign national
subsidies.3"'
Lastly, the possibility of a company moving its headquarters should continue
to drive the U.S. federal government to prefer domestic companies in defense
contract awards. As one of the most open defense markets, the United Kingdom
consistently awarded contracts to foreign companies instead of BAE Systems,
303. See discussion infra Part IV.A, suggesting that Congress and U.S. Government agencies cease
waiving price differentials.
304. GUAY, supra note 117, at 58-61.
305. MCLEAN, supra note 118, at 6.
306. GUAY, supra note 117, at 58-59.
307. MCLEAN, supra note 118, at 6.
308. Hensel, supra note 18, at 50.
309. GUAY, supra note 117, at 58. One such method may include ensuring price differentials are not
waived, even for countries with which the U.S. Government has reciprocal agreements. See discussion infra
Part W.A.
310. See, e.g., NORTHROP 2009 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 23; LOCKHEED 2009 ANNUAL REPORT,
supra note 253.
311. GUAY, supra note 117, at 58 ("Launch aid is money given to Airbus [EADS] partners to develop
new plane models ... including development, testing, and actual manufacturing.").
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United Kingdom's "national champion" of defense companies." 2 In a move to
increase global share of defense contracts, BAE Systems aggressively began
bidding and winning foreign contracts.313 With increased global share and lower
domestic preference in the United Kingdom, BAE Systems considered moving
its headquarters from the United Kingdom to the United States, which may have
had a profound impact on the United Kingdom's domestic defense industrial
base.3 4 The threatened move forced the U.K. government to adjust its defense
procurement policy in 2006, including promises to award an increasing number
of procurement contracts to BAE Systems."' While this issue has not yet
presented itself in the United States, this type of threat by any of the major U.S.
defense companies could be devastating to the United States, especially if one of
the "big three" defense players-Boeing, Northrop Grumman, and Lockheed
316Martin- carried out such a threat and moved its headquarters to another
nation. Not only could this type of move reduce taxable profits by the U.S.
Government, but it could also cut jobs held by U.S. citizens.
IV. SOLUTIONS FOR CONGRESS
As stated by Yale Historian Paul Kennedy, the summarized factors that led to
England's fall included:
a failure to invest sufficiently in new plant and laboratories, and in entire
new industries; an inadequately trained work-force, and an insufficient
supply of engineers and scientists as compared with foreign rivals.., a
social culture which accorded far greater prestige to the professions and
service industries (law, medicine, merchant banking, stock-brokering)
than to the business of building ships, turbines, machine tools and other
manufactures.3 7
The U.S. Department of Defense and Congress can perform many acts to
ensure major defense acquisition and procurement contracts are awarded to
domestic companies instead of foreign entities."' Such procedures, policies, and
lawmaking can help preserve the U.S. defense industrial base, technological




316. Id. at 8.
317. Hawkins, supra note 44, at 8 (quoting PAUL KENNEDY, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE GREAT
POWERS: ECONOMIC CHANGE AND MILITARY CONFLICT FROM 1500 TO 2000 (1987)).
318. Id. at 8-9
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superiority, and U.S. employment, thereby preventing a decline in military
prowess as was seen in Great Britain.319
A. Direct Domestic Procedures
In determining whether defense procurement contracts should be awarded to
domestic or foreign companies, the agency responsible for the decision should be
allowed to take into account socioeconomic factors in its analysis.320
Socioeconomic factors include the location where a majority of the goods will be
produced or manufactured,32' the effect on the U.S. defense industrial base,322 and
whether profits will end up in the United States or in foreign countries.3 23 Because
current U.S. procurement law prevents these considerations in awarding
contracts, Congress attempted to introduce legislation in 2008 that would have
forced the Department of Defense to consider these socioeconomic factors in the
Air Force tanker contest. 24 Though unsuccessful, this groundbreaking legislation
would have solved many of the concerns present in the current tanker contract
war, and Congress should continue to update procurement law so that these
factors are considered in defense contract awards.2
In addition, if after socioeconomic factors are considered there is still a
significant benefit to awarding the contract to a foreign company, Congress can
include stipulations in appropriations bills to ensure that a certain amount of the
product is produced or manufactured within the United States. 6 These types of
stipulations would ensure some jobs, especially those of a specific technical skill,
remain or are created within the United States."7 Such a stipulation could also
require that all sensitive or classified components should be installed by U.S.
companies that meet required security protocols.3 28 Both of these problems were
overcome in the Second Attempt, when EADS was partnered with the U.S.
corporation Northrop Grumman.329 Northrop Grumman would have been
responsible for assembling a majority of the aircraft in the United States, and
would also have been in charge of installing all classified and sensitive
materials. 3'0 Given that EADS was no longer partnered with a domestic company
319. Id.
320. Id. at 10.
321. Hensel, supra note 18, at 53.
322. Hawkins, supra note 44, at 11.
323. Congress Weighs in on Tanker Decision, Boeing Protests Award, 50 GOV'T CONTRACTOR 85
(2008).
324. Sevastopulo & Done, supra note 40.
325. See Congress Weighs in on Tanker Decision, Boeing Protests Award, supra note 323.
326. GUAY, supra note 117, at 67.
327. Id.
328. See Hensel, supra note 18, at 53.
329. See id. at 53-54.
330. Id.
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to alleviate these concerns in the Third Attempt,"' Congress could have
mandated that EADS find a U.S. subcontractor to perform the same work
Northrop Grumman was expected to complete within the United States by U.S.
citizens .3 3 2
On an international level, the U.S. Government can reign in the exemptions
of the Buy American Act, and Congress can amend the statute so that it applies to
some major contracts conducted outside of the United States,333 such as those
supporting the armed forces in the current Middle East conflicts. In connection
with these conflicts, nearly $5.8 billion dollars in contracts were granted to
foreign entities under the Buy American Act exemptions, mainly because of the
product's intended use outside the United States.3  Moreover, another large
award of contracts, both in number and in value, were to countries with which the
United States has reciprocal agreements, specifically countries whose defense
companies compete directly with U.S. companies. 35 By decreasing the number of
available waivers and exemptions, more contracts can be awarded to U.S.
companies instead of their foreign competitors.336
B. Competition, Research & Development, and Higher Education
In addition to measures that will directly affect individual defense
procurement and acquisition contracts, Congress should adopt indirect policies
and programs that will strengthen the defense industrial base. Congress should
explore options to increase the number of defense companies by not allowing
major mergers or acquisitions. 37 To increase technological innovation, Congress
can increase tax credits for companies performing in-house research and
development activities within the United States.33' Additionally, Congress should
331. Press Release, Northrop Grumman Corp., supra note 31.
332. GUAY, supra note 117, at 67 (suggesting that the employment of workers, rather than the
nationality of the bidding firm, should be a driving factor in determining which company to award contracts to).
Because of the sensitive nature of various technologies and contracts, many of these components require
security clearances that are much easier to obtain as a U.S. citizen.
333. See Lichtenbaum, supra note 222, at 321 ("only about 30 percent of defense procurements [are] off
limits to foreign firms").
334. FOREIGN SOURCES 2007 REPORT, supra note 70, at 10.
335. Id. A number of contracts were awarded to the United Kingdom and Germany, both of which house
some of the world's top 10 defense companies, including BAE Systems and EADS. JACKSON, supra note 153,
at 2.
336. See GRASSO, supra note 183, at 8-9. This policy may frustrate international politics, trade
agreements, and military operations given a number of these countries are U.S. allies in the Global War on
Terror. See Miller, supra note 104, at 110. However, given the current nature of Europe's closing defense
market, it is unlikely that any consequential retaliation will occur.
337. See Hawkins, supra note 44, at 10 (noting the reduced competition within the United States as a
result of significant consolidation of the defense industrial base during the 1990s).
338. See, e.g., GUAY, supra note 117, at 54; Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, MANAGING THE
SUPPLIER BASE IN ThE 2 IST CENTURY 9 (2006); U.K. 2005 DEFENCE WHITE PAPER, supra note 122, at 35.
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increase the availability of scholarship and academic programs'" meant to
encourage U.S. citizens to obtain math, science, and engineering degrees.) °
These indirect procedures can help ensure the United States retains a
technological edge in the global defense market.34
A common theme found in arguments for globalization is that increased
competition will drive the market to produce the best product in terms of
affordability and quality.342 A healthy amount of competition already exists
among the U.S.'s defense industrial base,343 but the competition has decreased
since the consolidation of companies in the defense industry after the Cold
War. To prevent a reduction of competition within the United States, Congress
must remain vigilant in reviewing and denying the merger or acquisition of U.S.
defense companies. 34  This vigilance is especially necessary where the
consolidation of defense companies may result in a single-source supplier.3 46 If
this happened, the U.S. defense market would devolve to that of the United
Kingdom, which has a single domestic company to award contracts to and thus
no competition within its domestic market. 47
Another way to maintain or increase technological innovation is through
increased research and development spending. A number of studies have found
U.S. military technological dominance waning over the last decade due to
decreased spending on research and development. 348 The decreased efforts of
research and development, and thus lack of innovation,' can easily be corrected
by investing directly into government-funded projects targeted at specific niches
of technology that can be carried out by U.S. defense companies and the
339. See Jeffrey Mervis, Can Obama Strike a Deal with House Republicans?, 331 (6017) SCI. MAG.
520, 520-21 (2011), available at http://www.sciencemag.orgcontent/331160171520.full ("[W]hat the U.S.
research community really loved about Obama's speech, despite its call for a 5-year freeze on overall domestic
spending, was his continued emphasis on increased federal investments in research and science education to
maintain the quality of the country's scientific enterprise."). But see id. (summarizing House Rep. Chuck
Fleischmann, who "thinks the federal government shouldn't interfere in education at the state and local levels,
although he agrees with the White House that elementary and secondary schools need better science and math
teachers and that universities need to train more scientists and engineers").
340. GUAY, supra note 117, at 68.
341. See President Barack Obama, 2011 State of the Union Address (Jan. 25, 2011), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/01/25/remarks-president-state-union-address (suggesting a
better education system will increase technological innovation within the United States).
342. Borich, supra note 201, at 662; GUAY, supra note 117, at 37.
343. See JACKSON, supra note 153, at 2
344. Hawkins, supra note 44, at 10 ("A 2003 Pentagon report found that of the 50 largest defense
suppliers in the early 1980s, mergers and acquisitions had folded them into today's top five contractors.").
345. See id. (noting the reduced competition within the United States as a result of significant
consolidation of the defense industrial base during the 1990s).
346. See id.; see GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 338, at 10-11.
347. See discussion supra Part ll.C.2.b for the issues the United Kingdom is experiencing as a result of
having a single major domestic defense company. JACKSON, supra note 153, at 2 (BAE Systems).
348. Borich, supra note 201, at 656.
349. Id.
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commercial/civilian sector alike .3  An additional method for encouraging
innovation includes research and development tax credits."' These tax credits
should be awarded to help fund for research conducted at facilities located within
the United States employing U.S. citizens.352
Furthermore, the number of graduating students in the United States with
math and engineering degrees is declining when compared to other countries.353
By investing in a technologically-driven education system, the United States can
prevent a "brain drain" as a large portion of its workforce retires in the next
decade.354 The U.S. Government has an even smaller pool of talent to draw from,
as many engineering and science students in U.S. universities are foreign citizens
and, therefore, unable to obtain a security clearance necessary to work on
sensitive contracts with the Department of Defense.355 With less knowledge and
skills available, defense contractors will continue to move operations offshore in
order to attract and retain their necessary employment base.356 For specific areas
of engineering and science that meet a high-value "national need," Congress can
set up a number of education loan and scholarship programs to encourage U.S.
citizens to pursue technical degrees that will support the defense industrial
base.57 As stated in his 2011 State of the Union address, U.S. President Barack
Obama observed, "if we want to win the future-if we want innovation to
produce jobs in America and not overseas-then we also have to win the race to
educate our kids. 358
V. CONCLUSION
The U.S. defense industrial base is unparalleled in size and diversity.5 9 To
maintain this sovereignty, the U.S. Government should continue to implement or
strengthen domestic preference polices in the award of major military
procurement and acquisition contracts. The Department of Defense must realize
that decisions regarding large-scale contract awards cannot rely solely on price
mechanisms, as in the Third Attempt.?6 Additional factors concerning national
security implications and protectionism must be considered in all major defense
350. See, e.g., GUAY, supra note 117, at 54; GOv'T AccoUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 338, at 9.
351. U.K. 2005 DEFENCE WHITE PAPER, supra note 122, at 35.
352. GUAY, supra note 117, at 55 (identifying an increasing amount of U.S. research and development
funds being spent in "innovation centers" located in China and India).
353. Id. at 51.
354. Id.
355. Id. at 53.
356. Id. at 54.
357. Id. at 68.
358. Obama, supra note 341.
359. U.K. 2005 DEFENCE WHITE PAPER, supra note 122, at 21.
360. Drew, supra note 38.
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acquisition contracts to ensure the stability and strength of the U.S. defense
industrial base.
There are a number of reasons why the U.S. Government should prefer
domestic companies when awarding defense procurement contracts. During a
major conflict in which U.S. national security may be compromised by awarding
contracts to companies controlled by hostile countries, the U.S. armed forces
could secure the supply of goods with domestic producers.36' In addition, where
jobs are at stake in a global recession, the U.S. Government could award more
defense-related contracts to domestic suppliers such as Boeing in an attempt to
maintain, or even expand, the industrial base.
362
Congress can take a number of proactive steps to ensure the Department of
Defense continues to award major defense contracts to domestic companies, such
as Boeing's successful bid in the Third Attempt. 63 Procurement laws should be
updated so that the defense agencies are allowed to take socioeconomic factors
into account3 6 In the event a major contract is awarded to a foreign corporation,
Congress can require the company to produce a significant portion of the contract
to be fulfilled (or the item to be produced) within the United States, which would
ensure domestic industry sustainment.365 Congress should permit fewer mergers
between U.S. defense companies, as a larger number of defense firms would
create more internal competition for military contracts. Lastly, Congress must
remain vigilant in funding research and development,366 and in increasing the
number of science, math, and engineering education opportunities for U.S.
367citizens. Without the engineers to create new technology and sustain the
production of advanced military equipment, the domestic defense industrial base
will lag behind other countries.3 68 Given the importance of protecting national
security and the defense industrial base during major conflicts in the Middle East,
"I can't imagine a worse time in our history to outsource our national defense."
369
361. DEF. Sci. BD., supra note 45, at 18.
362. REICH, supra note 46, at 27.
363. Drew, supra note 38.
364. Hawkins, supra note 44, at 10.
365. GUAY, supra note 117, at 67.
366. See Borich, supra note 201, at 656.
367. GUAY, supra note 117, at 68.
368. See id. at 54.
369. Carpenter, supra note 1 (quoting Kansas Governor Kathleen Sebelius).
